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I. INTRODUCTION
After two hundred years of constitutional
decisionmaking, there is little consensus on the methods by
which constitutional cases should be decided. Various theories,'
and combinations of theories, ' have their followers. Fashions
come and go,' but the field of contenders does not permanently
narrow.
Nevertheless, a measure of order can be brought to the
confusion of the competing normative theories of constitutional
decisionmaking. Although no particular normative theory is
invariably better than the others, there are some crucial logical
and practical dependencies of the theories upon rival theories.
It is not merely that the theories overlap, come in various
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' See the several broad families of constitutional decision making theories
discussed infra Part II.A-F.
2 Some of the broad families of theories have obvious affinities. Perhaps the
most obvious candidates for a combined theory would be a form of constitutional
textualism requiring some attention to the original intent underlying the Constitution,
See infra Part II.C-D.
' Theories that have lost favor temporarily may regenerate themselves in
more sophisticated versions. See, e.g., references to the "new textualism" infra notes
185,201.
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forms and versions, and are hard to separate and distinguish.'
Rather, most of the contending theories, whatever their other
flaws, are crucially dependent on general moral principles, and
more precisely, upon one or more of their rival theories of
constitutional adjudication.'
Not all of the theories, however, are equal in their
degree of dependency on their rivals. We will offer a general
ranking of the theories in order of such dependency,'
understanding that this rank is not necessarily reflective of the
overall value or insightfulness of the theories. A theory that is
starkly dependent on a rival theory, or is otherwise incomplete,
might offer uniquely valuable insights.7 Nonetheless, we would
certainly want to consider a theory's degree of dependence on
its rivals in assessing its overall value.
Thus, this article views the normative theories of
constitutional decisionmaking as arrayed in a hierarchy of
dependence upon rival theories. It will expose the crucial
dependencies of the various theories not to dismiss any, but, as
the Hegelians say,8 to transcend those individual theories while
sustaining and preserving their distinctive value in deciding
constitutional cases. The goal is to accommodate the value of
4 According to some, textualism and original author intent are inseparable.
See, e.g., E.D. Hirsch's theory referred to infra notes 153, 159.
r The arrangement of theories below is intended to reflect a general
hierarchy of dependency, with admitted complications, and even some reciprocal
dependencies among the theories. By the idea of any Theory A being "dependent" upon
some rival Theory B, we do not mean merely that Theory B plays some important role
in the operation or attractiveness of Theory A. We mean as well that Theory A relies
upon Theory B in a particularly important way. Crucially, the idea is that because of
the nature of the dependence, Theory A's main critique of Theory B must unavoidably
come back to haunt - or apply to - Theory A with equal seriousness.
6 For well-known typologies with similar elements, see, e.g., Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherentist Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100
HARv. L. REV. 1189, 1194 (1987), discussed infra notes 155-57. See also PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-119 (1982).
Professor Bobbitt discusses historical (or original intent) arguments, textual
arguments, structural arguments (which we take to include textual as well as
pragmatic arguments), prudential arguments (a portion of our broadly pragmatic
arguments), and doctrinal arguments (including our precedential arguments, but also
including academic or judicial commentary we would classify based on their content).
See id. at 7. Bobbitt also discusses what he calls ethical or political ethos-based, as
opposed to moral, arguments. See id. at 94-95. We distinguish constitutional contract-
based arguments, infra Part ILE, and natural law and natural rights-based
arguments, infra Part I.F.
7 For example, the dependencies of textualism on rival approaches hardly
licenses our ignoring the text of the Constitution.
8 The classical term would be aufgehoben. For discussion, see, e.g., W.T.
STACE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL 106 (Dover Publications 1955) (1923).
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each of the rival constitutional theories, without sinking into a
mere eclecticism.
We must not oversimplify matters, however. There is a
difference between crucial foundational dependence and mere
supplementation or enhancement by rival theories. The
dependencies among the theories are multiple and to some
degree mutual or reciprocal," even among those ranked apart
from each other in the general dependence hierarchy." And
since each of the theories is actually a family of theories, with
broader and narrower versions,"2 the complications of ranking
constitutional theories in terms of dependence could be
multiplied indefinitely. But not all possible dependency
rankings are equally plausible, nor do they tell an equally
valuable overall story.
Any progress along these lines will first require
identifying the most important families of normative
approaches to constitutional decisionmaking 3 There are six
more or less distinguishable approaches," setting aside the
inevitable overlaps and the varied possibilities for combination
and subdivision." Part II of this article will discuss these six
general constitutional approaches: (1) Contemporary
Constitutional Pragmatism;" (2) Case Precedent-Based
Theories; 7 (3) Textualist Theories;8 (4) Originalist or Original
Intent-Oriented Theories;" (5) Constitutional Contractarian or
9 See infra Part II.D (following how originalist theories may be
supplemented by precedent-based theories, but are foundationally dependent upon
constitutional-contractarian and ultimately upon natural law or natural rights-based
theories).
. For example, it is difficult to develop an original intent theory or a
constitutional contractarian theory in which both do not significantly rely upon one
another. See infra Part II.D-E.
" For example, if we are seeking the original intent of drafters and ratifiers,
we may well be tempted at one point or another to draw upon pragmatist assumptions.
12 For example, in seeking the meaning of a text, or in seeking original
intent, we could narrowly confine ourselves to the passage itself, the entire document,
or to a narrower or broader range of external sources, such as the Federalist Papers.
" Our inclusions and exclusions differ in only limited ways from those of
other writers. See also the listing in GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
40-43 (4th ed. 2001) (listing original intent, textualism, precedent, prevailing social
consensus, and principles of justice). See also infra notes 156-57 (Fallon typology) and
supra note 6 (Bobbitt typology).
14 See infra Parts IIA-F.
5 See, e.g., supra note 2.
16 See infra Part II.A.
" See infra Part II.B.
18 See infra Part II.C.
'9 See infra Part I.D.
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Contract Theories;0 and (6) Particularized Natural Law and
Natural Rights-Oriented Theories.2 These approaches are
addressed in order of generally greatest dependence to least
dependence, logically or in practice, upon one or more rival
such approaches. Part II will argue that not all constitutional
theories are equally dependent upon one another, and that
some rough, imperfect hierarchy of dependence among the
theories can be developed. It concludes that a very inclusive,
broadly defined family of natural law and natural rights
theories is the least dependent upon its rivals. Given the
breadth and inclusiveness of the natural law and natural
rights family of theories, along with their relative
independence, this Part suggests that we should think of
constitutional decisionmaking as inescapably a complex
morally-governed act.22
Part III. A therefore addresses certain basic questions
about moral decisionmaking. Moral talk in general often
involves discussions not only of rights and of right and wrong,
but also of good and bad and even of virtue and vice.2 It will
thus explore whether the Constitution, or our constitutional
culture, steer us toward talking in one set of terms rather than
another. Finally, Part III. B addresses whether there is any
real, practical difference between aspiring to reach objectively
morally better constitutional decisions and abandoning any
aspiration to moral objectivity in constitutional
decisionmaking. Although constitutional decisionmaking is
inevitably haunted by much indeterminacy, we will argue that
the aspiration to moral objectivity nevertheless can make a
practical difference, and indeed a difference for the better.24
II. THE CANDIDATE THEORIES AND THEIR HIERARCHY OF
DEPENDENCE
A. Contemporary Constitutional Pragmatism
This section will focus on pragmatism in a
constitutional context. It will conclude that whatever merits or
20 See infra Part II.E.
21 See infra Part II.F.
22 See generally infra Part III.
23 See generally infra Part III.
24 See generally infra Part III.B.
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defects constitutional pragmatism may otherwise have,25 it
must rank as the single approach most crucially and
pervasively dependent upon rival theories." Indeed,
constitutional pragmatism is not so much merely dependent as
omni-dependent on its various rivals.
Of late, pragmatism's influence on the law in one form
or another 7 has been substantial." American philosophical
pragmatism has been developed and transformed by writers
such as Charles Sanders Peirce,2 William James," John
Dewey,' and, most notably in the contemporary academy,
Richard Rorty." In the legal field, the proponents of one form or
another of constitutional pragmatism include academics such
as Daniel Farber" and the well-known Seventh Circuit judge
Richard A. Posner.' Both Professor Farber and Judge Posner
have explicitly addressed matters of constitutional
methodology and theory.
25 For broader discussion, see R. George Wright, Pragmatism and Freedom of
Speech, 80 N.D. L. REV. 103, 123 (2004).
26 See the rationale developed infra Part II.A.
2' Thus while William James, Richard Rorty, Daniel Farber, and Richard
Posner can all be called pragmatists, their respective pragmatisms vary significantly.
See infra notes 30, 32-34.
See, e.g., the work of Professor Farber and of Judge Posner, infra notes 35-
36. See also Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought,
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Symposium, The Revival of Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1 (1996).
29 See, e.g., CHARLES S. PEIRCE, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, in
PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF PEIRCE 23 (Justus Buchler ed., Dover Publications 1955)
(1878).
See, e.g., WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM (Prometheus Books 1991) (1907).
31 See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, RECONSTRUCTION IN PHILOSOPHY (Beacon Press ed.
1948) (1920).
32 See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979);
RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982); RICHARD RORTY,
CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989); 1 RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY,
RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (1991); 3 RICHARD RORTY, TRUTH AND
PROGRESS: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (1998).
3 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72
MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988) [hereinafter Farber, Legal Pragmatism]; Daniel A. Farber,
Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatism for the Twenty-First Century, 1995 U. ILL. L.
REV. 163 (1995). [hereinafter Farber, Reinventing Brandeis].
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003)
[hereinafter POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY]. Justice Stephen Breyer
seems to endorse a broad form of value-based pragmatism when he emphasizes
consequences, in constitutional value terms, in judicial decisionmaking. See Stephen
Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 247-50 (2002).
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Professor Farber, by himself' and in collaboration with
Philip Frickey' and Suzanna Sherry," endorses pragmatism in
partial contrast to "high level" or "grand" constitutional
theory.3 Farber's constitutional pragmatism seeks to be
eclectice without being so in a merely "ad hoc""0 or totalistic
fashion.41 He rejects what he refers to as "foundationalism"2 in
constitutional theory43 or "confining reason to logical deduction
from set premises." Professor Farber's attempts to avoid a sort
of Cartesianism" in constitutional theory, in which a
foundationalist seeks to construct an elaborate and broadly
applicable theory in hierarchical fashion, based upon one or a
few intuitively certain foundational principles. He is suspicious
of such a rigorous, deductivist reliance on unassailable basic
premises.4
35 See, e.g., Farber, Legal Pragmatism, supra note 33; Farber, Reinventing
Brandeis, supra note 33; Daniel A. Farber, Book Review, Shocking the Conscience:
Pragmatism, Moral Reasoning, and the Judiciary, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 675 (1999)
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY
(1999)).
s See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the
First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615 (1987).
31 See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING
CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002). This
work is reviewed by Steven D. Smith, Desperately Seeking Serenity, 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 523 (2002).
8 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 36, at 1615-16. See also Suzanna Sherry,
Too Clever by Half The Problem with Novelty in Constitutional Law, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
921, 922 (2001); FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 37, at 140-68.
39 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 36, at 1616.
4 Id. at 1617.
41 See id. at 1627-28.
42 See id. at 1616-17.
Pragmatists generally, and Professor Farber in particular, use
foundationalism in more than one sense. See, e.g., RORTY AND HIS CRITICS (Robert B.
Brandom ed., 2000) (discussing the several perspectives of pragmatism). See also
Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 593, 610
(1999) (discussing legal pragmatism as anti-theoretical in the sense of denying "that
practices must be grounded in any foundation"). Farber associates constitutional
foundationalism variously with unitary versus pluralist theory, deductivism,
intuitively grounded theory, and with theory designed not to change or adapt. See
Farber, Legal Pragmatism, supra note 33, at 1334-37, 1342. Each of these elements
could be present without the other. Each could pull in different directions. And we
could imagine a theory that combines intuition and deduction with other modes of
reasoning in an overall coherence-focused web-like structure - which would probably
not be far from "common sense."
See Farber & Frickey, supra note 36, at 1617.
45 See supra text accompanying note 43.
46 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 36, at 1616.
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Professor Farber's pragmatic approach thus seeks to
avail itself of "practical reason"' and "the full range of cognitive
abilities"' 8 beyond merely narrow, rigid deductivism. Professor
Farber prefers "thinking small,"" inclusively, and flexibly.
Closely associated with Professor Farber's pragmatism are
"intuitionism"' - presumably not the kind of intuitionism that
is often associated with foundationalism 5  - as well as"prudence, "" "situation-sense," ' and "contextual justification."'
For example, Professor Farber focuses on Justice
Brennan's multi-dimensional, overlapping consensus-oriented 51
opinion in the landmark libel case of New York Times v.
Sullivan." Justice Brennan's opinion in Sullivan is said to
exemplify decisionmaking "not by deductive logic, but by a less-
structured, problem-solving process involving common sense,
respect for precedent, and a sense for society's needs." 5' For
Professor Farber, "it is [Justice] Brennan's 'situation-sense,' his
authentic attachment to first amendment values, and his
immersion in the first amendment tradition that deserve
emulation."'
In parallel fashion, Professor Farber has defended
constitutional pragmatism against the claims that it
"disregards precedent"" or "denigrates legal rights"' by
asserting that it wishes merely to emphasize "context,
judgment, and community."" Put summarily, "Itihe heart of
pragmatist thought is the view that the ultimate test is always
47 Id.
4 Id. at 1617.
49 Id. at 1627.
5 Id. at 1645.
" See Farber & Frickey, supra note 36, at 1616, 1639.
52 Id. at 1646. See also FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 37, at 925 (citing the
work of Dean Anthony Kronman).
'3 Farber & Frickey, supra note 36, at 1635, 1637.
64 Id. at 1647.
55 See id. at 1635-38 in the context of John Rawls, The Idea of an
Overlapping Consensus, 7 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1987).
'8 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (avoiding the arguably more unitary or absolutist
approaches of Justices Black, Douglas, and even Goldberg).
17 Farber & Frickey, supra note 36, at 1636 (footnotes omitted).
'8 Id. at 1637.
Farber, Legal Pragmatism, supra note 33, at 1332.
60Id.
61 Id. at 1335. See also Michael C. Dorf, Create Your Own Constitutional
Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 593, 593 (1999) ("endorsing constitutional pragmatism-as-
contextualism") (a decision in context as preceding, not following, a choice of theory).
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experience." 2 Farber's view is that "[1]egal pragmatism - which
essentially means solving legal problems using every tool that
comes to hand, including precedent, tradition, legal text, and
social policy - renounces the entire project of providing a
theoretical foundation for constitutional law."' In sum,
Professor Farber writes that:
Pragmatism provides no reason to exclude consideration of original
intent, precedent, philosophy, social science, or anything else that
might be appropriate and helpful in resolving a hard case. Ideally,
all of these factors point to the same outcome. When they conflict,
the only possible recourse is to make the best decision possible under
the circumstances.'
This suggests how Professor Farber's pragmatic
approach to constitutional adjudication relates to alternative
approaches. Does his constitutional pragmatism somehow
bypass or float freely above the other contending constitutional
theories introduced above?' In emphasizing experience and
common sense, has Professor Farber set his approach
independent of the rival constitutional theories? Or is the
relationship of pragmatism to the rival theories really one not
of independence, but of omni-dependence?
Professor Farber's own descriptions support the latter
view. He seeks to add to the appeal of constitutional
pragmatism by relying on, among other considerations,
precedent,' the relevant legal texts, 7  original intent,"
philosophy,' legal rights," and first amendment values,7"
presumably including democracy, autonomy, self-realization,
62 Farber & Frickey, supra note 36, at 1341. Farber is of course echoing
Holmes' dictum that 'the life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 1 (Little, Brown and Co. 1949)
(1881). Actually 'experience' either presupposes or requires some distinct theory before
we know how best to characterize or evaluate our experience.
Farber, Legal Pragmatism, supra note 33, at 1332.
Farber, Reinventing Brandeis, supra note 33, at 169.
6 See supra Part I. Note, however, that pragmatism builds a sense of the
value of precedent - the basis of a rival theory - into itself as one component, see supra
text accompanying notes 57, 59, just as precedent-based theories incorporate some
form of pragmatism, see infra text accompanying note 102.
See supra text accompanying notes 57, 59, 63, 64.
67 See supra text accompanying note 63.
68 See supra text accompanying note 64.
See supra text accompanying note 64.
70 See supra text accompanying note 60.
71 See supra text accompanying note 58.
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tolerance, and the pursuit of truth."2 It would be arbitrary to
criticize any constitutional theory because it is pluralist rather
than unitary, or web-like in structure rather than
foundationalist. Certainly, no plausible constitutional theory
can rely on rigorous deductive reasoning alone. It would also be
foolish for a constitutional theory to ignore experience, context,
situation, and a sense of "what works." In this, Professor
Farber's constitutional pragmatism is all to the good. The
theory, however, is not independent and freestanding, but
rather omni-dependent on its rival theories at roughly similar
analytical levels.
Constitutional pragmatism's omni-dependence tends to
involve the opportunistic incorporation of elements of rival
theories without much explanation of why, when, and in what
proportion elements are borrowed. As we have seen, each of the
rival constitutional methods73 is subject to adoption by the
pragmatist. ' With a bit of re-formulation and prioritization, the
rival theories of constitutional decisionmaking provide what
the pragmatic theory must have in order to operate in practice.
It is close to the essence of Professor Farber's pragmatism that
pragmatic constitutionalism does not borrow from the various
rival views in a specifically theory-driven way. Pragmatism
downplays, if it does not reject, any idea of formula. When the
incorporated rival theories" point in different directions, or
when the pragmatist must decide whether to incorporate a
rival theory, there can only be limited pragmatic theoretical
guidance. Since pragmatism relies on judgment" and
experience," when the borrowed elements of any of the various
rival theories conflict, "the only possible recourse is to make the
best decision possible under the circumstances." 8
Constitutional pragmatism thus will reflect at least the
theorist's or the judge's own common sense, but this itself
introduces a certain arbitrariness. What is "best" or what
experience teaches may be rather controversial. Consider, for
example, Justice Brennan's decision in Sullivan, as lauded by
72 See Farber & Frickey, supra note 36, at 1618-27, 1634-38. Cf Suzanna
Sherry, Textualism and Judgment, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1148, 1148 (1998) (legal
pragmatism as incorporating "our developing aspirations").
73 See infra Parts II.A-F.
74 See supra text accompanying notes 66-72.
75 See supra text accompanying notes 66-72.
76 See supra text accompanying note 61.
77 See supra text accompanying note 62.
78 See supra text accompanying note 64.
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Professor Farber.9 Is it pragmatically useful to say that
Sullivan exemplifies "respect for precedent?" ' One could, after
all, argue that Justice Brennan's actual malice rule either
under- or over- recognizes the precedential strength of a more
absolute protection of public criticism of official government
conduct."1
The strength of the claim that New York Times v.
Sullivan respects precedent depends in part on one's
conception of "precedent" and thus on the rival theory of
constitutional precedent itself. Justice Brennan's opinion in
Sullivan illustrates the pragmatist's need for an independent
theory of precedent in constitutional cases. His opinion could
merely have canvassed Supreme Court holdings for flexible but
narrow precedent regarding defamation and related civil or
criminal actions brought against media or other defendants by
public officials for criticism of their official conduct.' But
Justice Brennan's opinion also looked to case precedent in a
broader sense, in which prior free speech case law bespeaks"our profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open."' Precedent itself could, however, in a given
constitutional case easily point in different directions.
Certainly, precedent in the narrow sense' need not always
accord with precedent in the broad sense.'
Considering precedent both narrowly and broadly,
Professor Ronald Dworkin's" classic two-part approach to
adjudication, for example, is really all about precedent. The
first Dworkinian requirement of "fit" or coherence can include
either the narrow or both the narrow and broad senses of
79 See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
8' See supra text accompanying note 56. See also text accompanying note 59
(constitutional pragmatism generally as encompassing respect for case precedent).
8' See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297-98 (1964) (Goldberg
and Douglas, JJ., concurring in the result). See also id. at 268 n.6. What springs to
mind is the dicta from the Chaplinsky fighting words case assuming no constitutional
limits on state libel law. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72
(1942). Even the presence of sufficient state action or action under color of state law
might have been imagined to be debatable. But cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948) (state action via judicial enforcement of private racially restrictive real estate
covenants).
82 See the cases cited supra note 81.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270. See also Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986).
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
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precedent. The second Dworkinian requirement of justifiability
or jurisprudential soundness, or making the law the best it can
be, represents Brennan's broad sense of precedent." In this
sense, Dworkin's two-part focus on fit and justifiability is really
reducible to one approach: precedent.
The pragmatist's reliance on a broad sense of precedent
may take the pragmatist into the realm of basic moral and
legal rights.88 The concern for basic moral rights often serves as
a strongly principled, non-pragmatic basis for constitutional
decisionmaking.' As precedent in a broad sense may
encompass both parts of Professor Dworkin's approach to
adjudication, it will also inevitably include non-pragmatic
resources upon which constitutional pragmatism wishes to
draw.' Just as precedent in a narrow sense may limit the
possible judicial outcomes, it may also conflict with broader
jurisprudential considerations upon which the constitutional
pragmatist will also wish to draw, including basic moral and
legal rights."
Can the broad and varied dependencies of constitutional
pragmatism be limited through the pragmatic scholarship and
judicial decisions of Judge Richard Posner?" Judge Posner
certainly seeks to limit the dependence of his sort of
pragmatism on moral theory. By Judge Posner's own account,
"moral theory is useless."'7 He claims that his approach relies
upon case precedent, clear legal text, and then "on notions of
policy, common sense, personal and professional values, and
intuition and opinion, including informed or crystallized public
87 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. See generally DWORKIN, supra
note 86, at 49-113, 61 in particular.
88 It is, for example, hard to imagine Justice Brennan's celebrated language
quoted in text at note 83 supra as not invoking the ideas of basic moral and legal
rights.
89 See infra Part II.F.
90 See supra text accompanying notes 58, 60, 63, 64.
91 Certainly we might see Brown v. Board of Education as involving this
conflict. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
92 At this point, the most authoritative formulations of Judge Posner's
pragmatism would include RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY
(2003) and RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY
(1999). For commentary, see, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 1718 (1998); Daniel A. Farber, Shocking the Conscience: Pragmatism, Moral
Reasoning, and the Judiciary, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 675, 687 (1999) ("Posner's
discussion sometimes seems oddly oblivious to notions of human dignity"); Jeremy
Waldron, Ego-Bloated Hovel, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 597 (2000) (reviewing RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999)).
93 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, at
viii (1999).
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opinion." Judge Posner seeks to rely, where deemed
appropriate, on methods of social science, immersion in
relevant facts, and various policy considerations. If this sort of
constitutional pragmatism has an ultimate aim, it is "to
maximize the social utility of the law."95
However, Judge Posner has not succeeded in trimming
moral theory, as he himself understands the term, from the list
of the rival constitutional approaches upon which the
pragmatist crucially depends. For example, maximizing the
social utility of the law could come into conflict with elemental
fairness and distributional equality under the law. Posner is
certainly entitled to always prefer the former over the latter,
but he can hardly do so without recourse to some moral theory.
Perhaps Posner sees such judgments as merely a matter
of empirical investigation, fact-finding, good science, intuition,'
and common sense. 7 But each of these techniques crucially
relies on or implicitly embodies moral theory. Generally, a
reasonable defense of any tradeoff between utility and
distributional equity requires some basic moral theory." If
pragmatism seeks to maximize the social utility of the law
while avoiding all recourse to moral theory, or to grand or high
level theory (moral or not), it becomes self-contradictory.
Judge Posner's multi-factored pragmatism therefore
cannot meaningfully reduce the broad dependencies on rival
9 Id.
9' Id. at xi.
Intuitionism is, perhaps not entirely unrelatedly, the name of a recognized
approach to moral philosophy. See, e.g., H. A. PRICHARD, MORAL OBLIGATION (1949);
W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1930).
97 Judge Posner's common sense is complex, but often bears a sort of conduct-
libertarian, John Stuart Mill-type cast in constitutional matters. See American
Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001); see also Miller v.
Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J. concurring), rev'd
sub nom. See also Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). This may well be
the best and most defensible form of common sense, but it plainly invites and requires
some defense, at the level of moral theory, against different deliverances of "common
sense." . In fact, the Intuitionists cited supra note 96 were especially alert to just
this sort of tradeoff, and they would certainly not have endorsed a general unweighted
utility-maximizing solution in all cases. For a sophisticated contemporary contribution
to the theoretical debate, see generally Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS
VERSUS WELFARE (2002). See also J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS,
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973). We assume that the need for moral
philosophy cannot be bypassed merely by changing one's understanding of utility,
welfare, or wealth.
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theories of Farber's pragmatism.' Constitutional pragmatism
must ultimately assume its place as the single approach to
constitutional decisionmaking most thoroughly dependent,
logically and practically, on rival theories. "
B. Case Precedent-Based Theories
Similarly, using precedent to decide constitutional cases
inevitably requires a reliance on some other rival theory of
constitutional adjudication. In fact, precedent-based theories of
constitutional adjudication have the rival-theory dependence
problem metaphysically built in at their beginning. Clearly,
there can be no infinite series of cases extending backward in
time, and the first case in any series of cases could hardly have
been decided on the basis of precedent."1 Some other non-
precedent-based theory would inescapably be needed to account
for at least the first decision. As well, precedent-based theories
may also reference and rely crucially on one form or another of
pragmatism, thereby creating a disturbing hall-of-mirrors
effect."2 Just as pragmatism may build precedent theory into
itself, precedent-based theories may incorporate forms of
pragmatism. All things considered, however, precedent-based
theories must be ranked as second behind pragmatism in their
dependence on rival theories over the typical run of cases.
The Supreme Court confronted the theory of
constitutional precedent in the abortion regulation case,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.' The Casey plurality began by
Compare text accompanying notes 39-78 (Farber's pragmatism) with text
accompanying notes 92-95 (Posner's pragmatism). The above brief account of Posner's
adjudicative pragmatism should, for other purposes, be supplemented by the discussion
in POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 34, at 59-85, including
especially brief summary statements at 59-60 and 84-85 (supplementing what Posner
takes to be "the core of pragmatic adjudication - a disposition to ground policy
judgments on facts and consequences rather than on conceptualisms and generalities").
Id. at 85.
'0o To the extent that one form or another of legal pragmatism rejects or
ignores any aspirations to the ideal of objectivity in moral thinking, such matters are
briefly addressed infra Part III.
10' Cf ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, I-II, q. 2, a. 3 (Fathers of
the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. ed. 1947) (discussing first
causes and infinite past series).
102 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (plurality
opinion). For the opposing phenomenon of pragmatist theories building in the value of
precedent, see supra text accompanying notes 57, 59.
113 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Interestingly, though, Casey is also among the limited
number of modem cases that talk explicitly in terms of some constitutional contract or
covenant theory, a rival approach to constitutional adjudication, in the context of
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observing that "Itlhe obligation to follow precedent begins with
necessity, and a contrary necessity marks its outer limit ....
[N]o judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each issue
afresh in every case that raised it."' " Within the limits of"necessity," or what may amount to avoiding disproportionate
costs, there is therefore a range for discretionary reliance on
precedent."'° Addressing the limits of reliance on constitutional
precedent, the Casey plurality wrote:
[Wihen this Court reexamines a prior holding, its judgment is
customarily informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic
considerations designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior
decision with the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective
costs of reaffirming and overruling a prior case. Thus, for example,
we may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in
defying practical workability, . . . whether the rule is subject to a
kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling . . .; whether related principles of law
have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a
remnant of abandoned doctrine, . . . or whether facts have so
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old
rule of significant application or justification .... ."
asserting something like a basic natural right to liberty, which in turn raises yet a
third possible approach to constitutional adjudication. See id. at 901. Justice O'Connor
wrote for the plurality:
Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of
Americans to us and then to future generations .... [Ihe Constitution's
written terms embody ideas and aspirations that must survive more ages
than one. We accept our responsibility not to retreat from interpreting the
full meaning of the covenant in light of all of our precedents. We invoke it
once again to define the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution's own
promise, the promise of liberty.
Id.
104 Id. at 854 (O'Connor, J., for the plurality) (citing BENJAMIN N. CARDozO,
THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921)). For discussions of the fundamental
value of precedent or stare decisis in the rule of the law, see, e.g., Welch v. Texas Dept.
of Highways, 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987); Akron v. Akron Center, 462 U.S. 416, 419-20
(1982). The idea of "necessity" in this sense may already evoke pragmatist concerns,
but we need not insist upon this point.
105 Every judge who selects a precedent as most relevant must to some degree
re-think the scope and value of the precedent case, but this need not involve a thorough
re-consideration. As to this crucial precedent selection stage, it has been observed that
judges "regularly display amazing ingenuity in 'distinguishing' unfavorable precedents
that would otherwise be 'controlling.' Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On
Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 YALE L.J. 2031, 2034 (1996). The
genuine constraining power of 'precedent' on unsympathetic later judges may thus be
limited. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 68, 83 (1991) (discussing
willingness to overrule precedent as part of the Supreme Court's agenda-setting
process); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1, 81 (2001).
'06 Casey, 505 U.S. at 854 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
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This suggests that a precedent-based theory of
constitutional adjudication must at vital points rely on
supplementary principles."7 Even if a possible case precedent"'°
itself indicated when and why we should overrule case
precedent, ultimately some supplementary principles, beyond
those of precedent, will be required. Such supplementary
principles may or may not directly involve any of the major
rival approaches to constitutional decisionmaking.
A tendency to respect or to set aside some possible
precedent is doubtless partly a matter of politics and
personality." As the Court suggested in Casey,"' the reasoning
underlying either the application or the rejection of some
asserted precedent may be nearly as broad as the society's
politics itself. This breadth of potential reasoning allows for
crucial recourse to other rival theories of constitutional
007 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854; see id. at 944, 955 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[W]hen it becomes clear that a prior
constitutional interpretation is unsound we are obliged to reexamine the question.")
(citing West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943), which
overruled the recent constitutional precedent of Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310
U.S. 586 (1940) (mandatory public school flag salute and pledge of allegiance case)).
For a critique of Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Barnette, see Michael J. Perry,
Normative Indeterminacy and the Problem of Judicial Role, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
375, 388-89 (1996).
"8 That case itself cannot stand on an infinitely receding series of prior cases,
and even if we call the assumed "foundational" case self-evidently or intuitively right, a'self-evidence" theory is thus necessary to supplement the precedent-based theory.
109 Contrast the attitude toward tradition and precedent in a broad sense
between EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE (Thomas H. D.
Mahoney ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1955) (1791) and THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN:
BEING AN ANSWER TO MR. BURKE'S ATTACK ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (Mark Philp
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (1791). Michael Oakeshott, a writer in this respect of
Burkian sympathies, wrote of the Thomas Paine approach in these terms:
[Ihf by chance this [political or legal] tabula rasa has been defaced by the
irrational scribblings of tradition-ridden ancestors, then the first task of the
Rationalist must be to scrub it clean; as Voltaire remarked, the only way to
have good laws is to burn all existing laws and to start afresh.
MICHAEL OAKESHOrr, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 9 (1962) (footnote
omitted). According to Oakeshott, such a Rationalist "does not neglect experience, but.
. . often appears to do so because he insists always upon it being his own experience
(wanting to begin everything de novo)." Id. at 6. But see Hegel's letter to his student
Zeilmann observing that the French Revolution "cast off the fear of death and the life
of custom." EDWARD CAIRD, HEGEL 68 (AMS Press 1972) (1883). For a discussion of
Burke on the value of collective legal tradition as opposed to assertions of abstract
right, see Michael S. Moore, The Dead Hand of Constitutional Tradition, 19 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 263, 266-73 (1996). See also Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and
Tradition, 90 YALE L.J. 1029, 1047-48, 1066 (1990) (discussing respect for tradition as
not merely welfare-maximizing or a matter of fairness, but necessary to our very
identity as humans in a culture).11o See supra text accompanying note 106.
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adjudication beyond pragmatism,"' as well as to considerations
not logically tied to any such rival constitutional theory.
For example, textualism... and original intent".. theories
are relevant in determining how much weight to accord the
important constitutional and civil rights precedent of Hans v.
Louisiana."4 Hans has been taken for over a century to bar
suits in federal court against unconsenting states,"' despite the
fact that the text of the Eleventh Amendment refers explicitly
only to suits by citizens of another state."4 This has led some to
conclude that "we have two Eleventh Amendments, the one
ratified in 1795, and the other (so-called) invented by the Court
nearly a century later in Hans .. 11f This amounts to a
possible conflict between text and precedent, rather than a
renewed application of precedent that depends upon
textualism. But, notably, deciding whether to apply or overrule
case precedent, as in Hans, depends partially on constitutional
text and on textualist theories of constitutional adjudication.
An originalist approach to constitutional adjudication,
on the other hand, could be called upon to uphold the
precedential status of Hans. For some judges, Hans was both
rightly decided on the merits and then properly upheld as
precedent by virtue of an original constitutional intent to
uphold state sovereign immunity."' There is, in addition, a
"' See supra text accompanying note 102.
112 See infra Part II.C.
113 See infra Part IID.
114 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
11' See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
116 See id.; Mark Strasser, Hans, Ayers and Eleventh Amendment
Jurisprudence: On Justification, Rationalization and Soveregn Immunity, 10 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 251, 251 (2001) ("Hans held that the Eleventh Amendment precluded
citizens from suing their own states, lack of express language in the Amendment to
that effect notwithstanding.").
117 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 100 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(overruled by Seminole Tribe)). Note that the constitutional status of Hans can be
bolstered by the claim that some degree of respect for the rule of stare decisis is not
merely sound jurisprudential policy, but required by the Constitution or the Framers'
intent embodied therein. See Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis As a Constitutional
Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43 (2001). For an argument that stare decisis may
actually undermine constitutional due process requirements, see Amy Coney Barrett,
Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011 (2003).
118 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (explicitly opposing the text of the
Eleventh Amendment to what the amendment presupposes). See also Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 724 (1999) (discussing Hans and constitutional understandings in
disallowing a congressional attempt to subject unconsenting states to suit even in their
own state courts).
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certain natural law flavor to some of the language in Hans,"'
reflecting particular natural law theories of constitutional
decisionmaking that are distinct from those based on
precedent."' But the relevant natural law language in Hans
and elsewhere"' seems intended to defend the result in Hans on
the merits, rather than to sustain the continuing vitality of
Hans on the basis of its status as a precedent.
In other contexts, though, the defensibility of following
constitutional precedent may more directly depend upon rival
constitutional theories of natural law or natural rights.
Precedent cases may induce various kinds of reliance, and
overruling precedent may therefore impose various kinds of
hardship,'22 which may be objected to, among other grounds, as
violations of natural law."3 For example, in Casey, the plurality
found that reliance on Roe v. Wade weighed in favor of
sustaining a woman's right to have an abortion. The Court
explained "that for two decades of economic and social
developments, people have organized intimate relationships
and made choices that define their views of themselves and
their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion
in the event that contraception should fail."' Additionally, the
strong precedential value of a case may be deeply accounted for
by the precedent being somehow incorporated into our ongoing
constitutional contract,"' yet another rival theory of
constitutional decisionmaking. 12' Reliance on a case precedent,
after all, may stem from a sense that the government and the
public have agreed on some tax or social security principles
inviting sacrifice today for some benefit tomorrow.
In various respects, then,- a case-precedent-based theory
of constitutional decisionmaking generally involves crucial,
"9 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (referring to "the nature of
sovereignty"). See also id. at 69.
20 See infra Part I.F.
21 See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 724; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44; Barrett,
supra note 117.
122 See supra text accompanying note 106.
'23 Cf LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39-40 (1964) (discussing
appropriate respect for induced reliance and expectations as part of the internal
morality of the law).
".. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
plurality opinion).
".. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 901; see also supra text accompanying note
103.
126 See infra Part II.E.
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immediate dependencies on rival theories.2 7 It is typically
difficult for full arguments for or against applying a given case
precedent to be developed without essential reference to a rival
theory of constitutional decisionmaking. Casey has shown that
the positive or negative value of constitutional precedent can
take many forms. These include considerations of prudence and
pragmatism, '28 rule of law values,"u costs,' workability,"
special hardship,'32 and changes in related law33 and social fact
or sentiment." The Court has elsewhere recognized that in a
proper case, stare decisis "promotes the evenhanded,
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles,
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the
actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.""' The
Court has also concluded that "[a]dhering to precedent 'is
usually a wise policy, because in most matters it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be
settled right.""'" The primary concern is not with whether the
courts are right in defending reliance on precedent for such
reasons."7 Rather, the above sorts of reasons for adhering to
127 See supra text accompanying notes 100-23.
'28 See supra text accompanying note 106.
129 See supra text accompanying note 106.
130 See supra text accompanying note 106.
13 See supra text accompanying note 106.
2 See supra text accompanying note 106.
133 See supra text accompanying note 104. See also Suzanna Sherry, The
Eleventh Amendment and Stare Decisis: Overruling Hans v. Louisiana, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1260, 1264 (1990).
"'4 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (O'Connor, J.,
plurality opinion); Sherry, supra note 133, at 1264.
135 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (citing Vasquez v. Hillery,
474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986)).
16 Id. at 827 (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). See also Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent,
63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 49 (1989) ("For various reasons, primarily those concerned with
the informational and motivational limitations human decisionmakers face, adherence
to rules even when the rules dictate incorrect results ... may achieve more value and
thus be more 'correct' than deciding each case 'correctly.'").
137 Compare Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An
Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 585 (2001), with Frederick
Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 602 (1987). Fallon argues:
[A] good legal system requires reasonable stability; ... while decisions that
are severely misguided or dysfunctional should be overruled, continuity is
presumptively desirable with regard to the rest; .. . it would overwhelm
Court and country alike to require the Justices to re-think every
constitutional question in every case on the bare, unmediated authority of
constitutional text, structure, and original history.
Fallon, Jr., supra, at 585. Schauer's position, however, is somewhat different:
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precedent, particularly in constitutional cases,' ordinarily
involve reliance on some rival theory of constitutional
decisionmaking.
But perhaps both constitutional pragmatism and
precedent-based approaches to constitutional decisionmaking
are not merely dependent upon rival constitutional theories.
Perhaps, pragmatism or precedent-based constitutional theory
swallows up all that is of value in one or more rival
constitutional theories. Can pragmatist constitutional theory or
precedent-based theory rehabilitate its independence by
showing that they actually incorporate all that is valuable in
their rival theories, rather than merely being dependent upon
such rival theories?
If there are any grounds to suppose that pragmatism
could simply engulf precedent-based or other theories, they
would flow from the eclecticism and the openness of pragmatist
theory.' Professor Farber's pragmatism is open to drawing
upon "the full range" 4' of our cognitive abilities in resolving
problems, at least beyond what he calls deductivism' 4  or
foundationalism.' While for Farber's pragmatism, experience
is a touchstone,'" experience is decisive only in some ultimate
sense, rather than as a narrow methodological constraint.'"
Farber is open to a range of (typically small-scale) approaches
that might alone or in combination solve a constitutional
Without a universal answer to the question of whether stability is a good
thing, we cannot decide whether decision according to precedent is a good
thing. Stability may be unimpeachable in the abstract, but in reality stability
comes only by giving up some of our flexibility to explore fully the deepest
corners of the events now before us. Whether this price will be worth paying
will vary with the purposes to be served within a decisional domain.
Schauer, supra at 602.
"' It is typically assumed that the weight of stare decisis will commonly be
low in constitutional cases, given the difficulty of overturning an unpopular
constitutional decision of the Supreme Court via constitutional amendment. See Payne,
501 U.S. at 808 (quoting Burnet, 285 U.S. at 407 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). One could,
however, argue that we should be especially reluctant, perhaps on grounds of natural
rights or judicial integrity, to overrule constitutional precedents protecting basic
liberties or minority interests. See Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical
Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 705-
06 (1999) (discussing the views of Justice Thurgood Marshall).
139 See supra text accompanying note 39. Whether Judge Posner's version of
constitutional pragmatism actually encompasses distinctively moral argumentation is
subject to dispute. See supra text accompanying notes 93-98.
140 See supra text accompanying note 48.
141 See supra text accompanying notes 44--46.
142 See supra text accompanying notes 42, 45-46.
143 See supra text accompanying note 62.
1 See supra text accompanying note 62.
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problem, and the list of such approaches includes "anything
else""'4 that might help.
On the other hand, Professor Farber's inclusiveness is
in some respects limited, which gives his pragmatism in turn a
distinct and limited character. Specifically, Farber seeks to
avoid "ad hoc""' eclecticism, or an unprincipled, omnivorous
theory. As such, high level or grand theoretical
considerations, 7 along with deductivism and foundationalism,
and some forms of rationalist intuitionism, are to be avoided as
well." Ultimately, then, Farber's constitutional pragmatism
cannot deliver the entire scope and value of either precedent-
based or any other major theory of constitutional
decisionmaking. 9 Rival theories will always offer options,
depths, and priorities that neither pragmatism nor precedent-
based theories will want to adopt.
One further way to show the "indigestibility" of entire
rival theories involves a Kantian or right-based "deontic"'
critique of Professor Farber's theory. Suppose Farber's
pragmatic constitutionalist concludes that some given
constitutional outcome "works" in the pragmatic sense. A
deontic critic could reply that even if the constitutional decision
somehow "works" in Farber's pragmatic sense, the decision is
nonetheless morally wrong and thus morally unacceptable in
such a way that renders the decision unconstitutional, or at
least not the best constitutional outcome.
This does not necessarily mean that Professor Farber's
pragmatic approach fails in such a case, or that Farber's theory
is generally insensitive to deontic considerations. 1 Rather, the
point is that Farber's pragmatism cannot simply incorporate
145 See supra text accompanying note 64.
146 See supra text accompanying note 40.
147 See supra text accompanying note 38.
14 See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
149 Many natural law or natural rights-based theories, along with many
constitutional contractarian theories, will be more open to grand or high level theory,
for example, than is Farber's pragmatic theory. For a discussion see infra Part II.E-F.
'50 See, e.g., SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 2
(1982); Heidi M. Hurd, Justifiably Punishing the Justified, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2203,
2209-11 (1992); Philip Pettit, Consequentialism and Respect for Persons, 100 ETHICS
116, 117 (1989). See generally Heidi M. Hurd, What In the World Is Wrong?, 5 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 157 (1994).
151 Consider the apparently deontic thrust of Farber's critique of fellow
pragmatist Judge Richard Posner: "Posner's discussion sometimes seems oddly
oblivious to notions of human dignity. .. ." Daniel A. Farber, Shocking the Conscience:
Pragmatism, Moral Reasoning, and the Judiciary, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 675, 687
(1999).
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bodily such a broad deontic critique without distortion.
Constitutional pragmatism can swallow its rivals only by
distorting what its rival theories claim, or by contorting itself
to fit in all of its rivals. Realistically, as crucially dependent
upon their rivals as both pragmatism and precedent-based
theories are, neither can clear the field by claiming that
everything of value in all rival theories can be brought within
the scope of either pragmatist or precedent-based theories.
C. Textualist Theories
Following constitutional pragmatism and precedent on
the dependency continuum is textualism. Textualism as an
approach to constitutional decisionmaking comes in various
forms and strengths. Strong versions consider the text as the
sole source of legitimate constitutional decisionmaking, with
everything outside the text merely shedding more or less light
on the text'5 and its meaning."' It has been argued that "the
text itself is an obvious starting point of legal analysis,"" and
that arguments from the constitutional text are of "the
foremost authority.""' Weaker versions consider the text as
merely the primary source," and sometimes not even the most
useful source"7 of legitimate constitutional decisions. But in
"" See Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1127, 1171 n.188 (1987) (citing the work of Professor Thomas Grey).
"' E.D. Hirsch distinguishes between 'meaning,' the fixed and unaltered
expression of the author's intent, and 'significance,' a broader idea incorporating a
wider range of situations and actors. See E.D. HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN
INTERPRETATION 8 (1967). For a rather more extensive cataloguing of definitions of
meaning, see C.IK OGDEN & I.A. RICHARDs, THE MEANING OF MEANING 186-87
(Harcourt Brace Jonanovich 1989) (1923).
' Akhil Reed Amar, Textualism and the Bill of Rights, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1143, 1143 (1998).
155 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherentist Theory of
Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1194 (1987).
116 See Sherry, supra note 152, at 1171 n.188. See also Fallon, Jr., supra note
155, at 1193-94 ('[T]he implicit norms of our constitutional practice accord the
foremost authority to arguments from text, followed, in descending order, by
arguments concerning the framers' intent, constitutional theory, precedent, and moral
and policy values."). For arguable reversals of this ranking, see cases relying upon the
independent agency case of Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
Note that Professor Fallon's theory seeks to place a distinct category of precedent,
between what one might otherwise think of as adjoining categories: constitutional
theory, and moral and policy values.
157 See Fallon, Jr., supra note 155, at 1194 (claiming that in hard cases, high
ranked textualist arguments are actually "least likely to prove uniquely persuasive or
determinate").
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contrast it has been argued, too strongly but not without point,
that there is really no such thing as textualism.
Regardless, while the text may appear to play some role
in interpretation, textualism may mask the role of other forces
at work." This section shall focus on forms of constitutional
textualism defined broadly enough to be of some use, but not so
broadly as to build rival constitutional theories into the very
definition of textualism. Textualism set adrift from anyone's
intent, purpose, or circumstance may well practically amount
to "nothing." Indeed, there is some logic in uniting textualism
and some form of original intent into a single constitutional
theory.' This section, however, will treat the relations between
textualism and other constitutional theories as matters to be
discovered or decided, rather than as matters of pure
definition."
To begin, it is important to note that although the
constitutional text may provide "an obvious starting point'' for
constitutional decisionmaking, the authority of the text itself"
is not self-evident and beyond argument. Despite the
familiarity of appeal to the constitutional text, H. Jefferson
Powell has emphasized the problem of constitutional textual
authority across an extended period of time. He has argued
that:
Nowhere else in space or time, except where our example has been
followed, have women and men claimed to resolve the most basic
questions of political morality through exegesis of the aging work
product of a committee adjourned two centuries ago. There is
nothing self-evident, to me at any rate, about such an odd tribalcustom."'
158 Paul E. McGreal, There Is No Such Thing as Textualism: A Case Study in
Constitutional Method, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2393, 2397 (2001). In the abstract, the
'other forces" might include rival constitutional theories.
"'9 Professor Michael Perry, for example, distinguishes between textualist and
non-textualist approaches to constitutional adjudication, preferring the former, and
then distinguishes between originalist textualism and non-originalist textualism, again
preferring the former. See Michael J. Perry, Brown, Bolling & Originalism: Why
Ackerman and Posner (among Others) Are Wrong, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 53, 54 (1995). See
also HIRSCH, supra note 153, at 1 (referring to "the sensible belief that a text means
what its author meant").
160 As we shall see in Part II.D. infra, the dependency relations between
textualist theories and originalist theories are, to some degree, reciprocal rather than
one-directional.161 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
162 See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
' H. Jefferson Powell, Parchment Matters: A Meditation on the Constitution
as Text, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1427, 1428 (1986) (footnotes omitted). Professor Powell
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If Professor Powell's concerns are answerable at all,
they are best answered not only through the text itself, but
through thinking about the ways in which constitutional
textualism depends upon rival theories of constitutional
decisionmaking. In order to attempt to legitimize textualism
through textualism's relationships to rival theories, the most
useful focus is actually not on the closely related original intent
theory. Thinking about the intent of the original drafters or
ratifiers will make little progress in explaining why the
constitutional text might be authoritative over time. In this
respect, textualism and original intent theory are "too close,"
and share too many assumptions. An original intent focus
seems to merely raise Professor Powell's question in a
somewhat different way.
Thus, this section focuses on ways in which textualism
depends upon some sort of constitutional contractualist
theory," or upon some natural law or natural rights-based
theory." A text typically cannot establish its own moral
bindingness merely by self-proclamation or by other exclusively
internal evidence. Any text, after all, could claim to be morally
or legally binding. But, on the other hand, a central function of
a genuinely valid contract is to exert its authoritativeness
across time. ' And it is characteristic as well of some natural
law or natural rights theories that certain general rights
concludes that "[by defining a common political idiom for a morally pluralistic society,
by conserving the achievements of the past, and above all, by its power to provoke us to
new insights, the Constitution-as-historical-document has justified the central place we
give it in our political discourse." Id. at 1434-35. How the text of the equal protection,
due process, or privileges and immunities clauses have themselves steered us toward
their own best interpretation is unclear. For further development of Professor Powell's
point, see David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson's Principle,
112 YALE L.J. 1717, 1719 (2003) ("[Tihe text of the Constitution provides a common
ground among people, and in that way it facilitates the resolution of disputes that
might otherwise be intractable. Sometimes . . . it is more important that things be
settled than that they be settled right, and the provisions of the Constitution settle
things.").
164 See infra Part II.E.
' See infra Part II.F. See also Douglas W. Kmiec, Natural-Law Originalism -
Or Why Justice Scalia (Almost) Gets It Right, 20 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 627, 627
(1997).
16 See, e.g., Interlaken Serv. Corp. v. Interlaken Condominium Ass'n, 587
N.W.2d 456, 1998 WL 692837, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) ("The purpose of a contract is
to provide the parties with certainty and stability despite future events.") (emphasis
added). Of course, certainty and stability in the law, constitutional and otherwise, is
promoted not just by otherwise valid contracts, but by precedent as well, as noted in
our discussion of precedent-based theories of constitutional interpretation. See supra
Part II.B.
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persist across time. 16 7 Only when constitutional textualism
looks to these and other" rival theories for vital
supplementation does the possible binding authority of a text
across time make maximum sense.
Some hints as to possible dependencies of textualism on
rival constitutional theories can be gathered from the cases in
which the constitutional text is de-emphasized."' As seen in
connection with precedent-based theories, °7 1 the Supreme Court
de-emphasized the importance of the text of the Eleventh
Amendment in Hans v. Louisiana.1 and succeeding cases.'72 A
textualist theory that seeks to account for Hans would have to
incorporate crucial elements of original intent theory73 or
natural law theory,"' focusing in this context on the breadth
and importance of state sovereignty. But a textualist theory
broad enough to incorporate all the needed elements of these
rival constitutional theories risks no longer being distinctively
textualist.
Some tendency in the direction of a more plausible but
no longer distinctive textualism is seen in the First
Amendment opinions of Justice Black.' Justice Black's
supposed literalist textualism 171 is in fact selective. The First
Amendment language of "Congress," 77 as a potential limitation
on the scope of the amendment, is not taken literally, for
167 See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 351
(Clarendon Press 1999) (1980) (underlying general natural principles as at that level
unchanging over time). Aquinas discusses the question of change in the natural law in
AQUINAS, supra note 101, at q. 94, a. 5.
16 One could certainly argue as well that a further contributor to any sense of
the legitimate bindingness of a given constitutional text over time is the continuity of
the case law interpreting that text, with any possible reliance induced thereby. This is
of course the province of precedent-based theories of constitutional decisionmaking. See
generally supra Part IIB; see also supra text accompanying note 166.1 We must again bear in mind, though, that a court could de-emphasize the
constitutional text for reasons not directly tied to any rival theory of constitutional
decisionmaking.
170 See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
171 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
172 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
173 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
175 See in particular Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865,
874 (1960) ("The phrase 'Congress shall make no law' is composed of plain words, easily
understood.").
176 See id.
177 See U.S. Const. amend. I.
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example.'78 Of all the major constitutional theories, textualism
has the least to say about why "Congress" should include the
federal executive and judicial branches. A textualism that
crucially reads "Congress" to include the two other federal
governmental branches, however plausibly, is really not
distinctly textualist.
This point is not confined to First Amendment
textualism, or to Justice Black. A reasonably narrow or
distinctively textualist theory can, for example, account for the
result in Brown v. Board of Education79 on Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection grounds. But only a much
broader and far less distinctively textualist theory can
reasonably account for a similar result, on Fifth Amendment
due process grounds, in Brown's federal companion case of
Bolling v. Sharpe.'" The text of the Fifth Amendment, after all,
does not offer much of an equal protection clause. Thus,
familiar versions of constitutional textualism "must develop
mediating principles"8' of one sort or another, often crucially
relying on rival constitutional approaches.'82
This reliance on rival theories cannot be avoided by
recognizing that a text may not be "crystal-like,"" and may
actually operate as "a network of different messages depending
on different codes and working at different levels of
178 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715 (1971)
(Black, J., concurring) ("In seeking injunctions against these newspapers and in its
presentation to the Court, the Executive Branch seems to have forgotten the essential
purpose and history of the First Amendment."). See also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 142-43 (1951) (Black, J., concurring) (arguing that a
blacklist prepared pursuant to Executive Order as objectionable on several grounds,
including as censorship irreconcilable with the First Amendment).
179 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
180 347 U.S. 497 (1954). For discussion of the distinction between
constitutional textualists and supplementers, see Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as
Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984). One could certainly argue that the major hurdle
in Bolling was the original intent of the Fifth Amendment Framers rather than the
text itself, but any fully satisfactory textualist approach to Boling would have to
borrow some combination of rival theories, including even a sense of natural law or
natural rights. See Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500 (labeling it "unthinkable" that segregated
schools could be prohibited at state but not at federal level). See also id. at 499
(pointing to equal protection and due process as "both stemming from our American
ideal of fairness .... Discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due
process.").
181 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 853 n.3 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
182 See id. (departing from case precedent in favor of one reading of an
ambiguous text as requiring some set of mediating principles).
1'3 UMBERTO ECO, THE ROLE OF THE READER: EXPLORATIONS IN THE
SEMIOTICS OF TEXTS 5 (1984).
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signification."" The vagueness and ambiguity of the
constitutional text creates not just possibilities for textualism,
but problems for textualism as well. Textualism thus requires
crucial supplementation. We need not argue that the text of the
Constitution is open to just any appealing interpretation." But
crucial phrases in the Constitution are remarkably compressed,
and compression can result in crucial ambiguity." The
problems of ambiguity are sometimes best resolved through
supplementation by some other theory, apart from further
complications or refinements of textualism.
Consider the implications of a concise survey by the
well-known literary theorist and critic William Empson:
[A] word may have several distinct meanings; several meanings
connected with one another; several meanings which need one
another to complete their meaning; or several meanings which unite
together so that the word means one relation or one process....
'Ambiguity' itself can mean an indecision as to what you mean, an
intention to mean several things, a probability that one or other or
both of two things has been meant, and the fact that a statement has
several meanings."'
184 Id. This general description seems apt regarding texts such as the tersely
formulated Free Speech Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or the Fourteenth
Amendment generally.
185 But cf David A. Strauss, The New Textualism in Constitutional Law, 66
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1157 (1998) ("The Constitution is phrased in such broad
terms that a judge who adheres simply to the text can do essentially anything he or she
wants."); Mark V. Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional
Theory, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 685 (1985) ("[E]very version of textualism licenses a
judge to require anything from laissez faire to socialism."). For background, see the
middle-of-the-road approach taken in UMBERTO EcO, THE LIMITS OF INTERPRETATION
24 (1990).
On one side it is assumed that to interpret a text means to find out the
meaning intended by its original author or - in any case - its objective nature
or essence, an essence which, as such, is independent of our interpretation.
On the other side it is assumed that texts can be interpreted in infinite ways.
Taken as such, these two options are both instances of epistemological
fanaticism.
Id. See also id. at 21 ("[Mlodern interpreters are wrong in taking every text as an
unshaped world . . . ."). In the legal as well as broader literary context, see Stanley
Fish, How Come You Do Me Like You Do? A Response to Dennis Patterson, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 57, 62 (1993). ("As a Miltonist or a teacher of contracts, I am never in the position
of deciding what 'counts' as a constraint because the possible routes of decision are
marked out for me in advance by a disciplinary history I could not ignore without
opting out of the discipline altogether.").
18' See WILLIAM EMPSON, SEVEN TYPES OF AMBIGUITY 31 (New Directions
1966) (1930).
'8' Id. at 5-6 (footnote omitted). One could, in the constitutional sphere, easily
argue that texts or text-fragments such as "equal" or "equal protection of the laws"
could exemplify each of these listed possibilities. For what is arguably the best sorting
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Common experience suggests that each of these
possibilities inheres not only in the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment," but at strategic points throughout the text of the
Constitution.
Unless constitutional textualism is defined in a
remarkably broad way, even a well-developed constitutional
textualist theory is incomplete. A textualist could, in theory,
broaden the scope of textualism by maintaining that the text
itself somehow includes all of its own context. Such a
remarkable broadening can be supported by the conclusions of
literary deconstructionists"9 as well as of sitting federal
appellate judges."
The idea of context is itself ambiguous, and if defined
broadly enough would encroach on or borrow from rival
theories of constitutional decisionmaking. A text, by itself, is
not sufficient to establish much social meaning or "significance"
in Professor Hirsch's terms.9 ' We cannot first merely read a
constitution or other text, and only then begin a process of
interpreting the text.'92 Hans-Georg Gadamer observes that
"[wihen one brings a text to speak through reading . . . one
takes up the meaning that resides in the line of meaning which
the reader himself or herself has already opened up.""2
out of various kinds and degrees of distributional equality, see LARRY S. TEMKIN,
INEQUALITY (1983).
188 See supra text accompanying note 187.
189 See Ronald K L. Collins, Outlaw Jurisprudence?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 215, 238
(1997) (reviewing DECONSTRUCTION IN A NUTSHELL: A CONVERSATION WITH JACQUES
DERRIDA) ("[N]o self-respecting deconstructionist would grant the text-context
distinction, particularly if - as in... constitutional law - the controlling assumption is
that text governs .... ").
'90 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1119, 1122-23 (1998) (depicting Chief Justice John Marshall as a textualist,
and in particular as a textualist who avoided relying on "imputed intent," or the
drafting and ratifying debates, or case precedent, or the Federalist Papers, but who
nonetheless did rely on "the context that gives text meaning"). It is unclear why the
context that gives meaning could not include much of what Chief Justice Marshall is
said to have avoided relying on.
191 See Farber, supra note 151. See also Stanley Fish, Response: Interpretation
Is Not a Theoretical Issue, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 509, 510 (1999) ("[Tlhe words [of a
text] will only say what they will say in the light of an intention, and will say different
things in the light of different intentions.").
192 See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, Reflections on My Philosophical Journey, in
THE PHILOSOPHY OF HANS-GEORG GADAMER 3, 53 (Richard E. Palmer trans., Lewis
Edwin Hahn ed., Open Court 1997) ("[R]eading itself is already an interpretation of
what is meant .... ").
193 Id. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer /Statutory Interpretation,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 613 (1990) (Gadamer's approach as suggesting "that we do not
discover the truth of the [statutory text] provision by limiting our vision to the bare
text, or to the original legislative expectations, or to current policy. All of these
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A textualist could conceivably embrace all of this
creativity by different readers at different times and
circumstances as part of textualism itself. But this would be an
unusual approach for a constitutional textualist. As a practical
matter, much of the interest in textualism is as an alternative
to, not an embodiment of, this sort of unfinished,'" perpetually"evolving," "living," diversely readable Constitution.95 Leading
constitutional textualists, such as Justice Scalia,'96 inevitably
find that they are driven beyond their own conception of
textualism to somehow embrace what amount to rival theories
of constitutional decisionmaking as well. Justice Scalia may,
for example, begin and in some instances end, with the
constitutional text.197 But his textualist theory is, of necessity,
quickly supplemented by various considerations, some of which
amount to or involve rival approaches to constitutional
decisionmaking. Justice Scalia recurs, where appropriate, to
"tradition,"' 8 which may encompass judicial precedents.'" At
perspectives work together, and each teaches us something."); David Couzens Hoy,
Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and Poststructuralist Perspectives, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 135, 137 (1985) (Gadamer's approach as arguing that "a sharp distinction cannot
be drawn between understanding the text in its own terms and reading the
interpreter's concerns into it"); Francis J. Mootz, III, The Ontological Basis of Legal
Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas,
and Ricoeur, 68 B.U. L. REV. 523, 535-36 (1988) ("No text has an essential meaning;
instead the text is appropriated continually by historically situated readers."). See also
TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 60-64 (Univ. of Minnesota
Press 2d ed. 1996) (on Gadamer and Hirsch).
'94 See JOEL C. WEINSHEIMER, GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS: A READING OF
TRUTH AND METHOD 14 (1985) ("The text is an unfinished process, one that is
continually completed in the history of its being understood.").
195 See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 816 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tihe Constitution is not a static document whose meaning in every detail
is fixed for all time by the life experience of the Framers."). See generally Arlin M.
Adams, Justice Brennan and the Religion Clauses: The Concept of a Living
Constitution, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1319 (1991).
'9 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 23-25 (1997). For Justice Scalia's approach to what he
distinguishes from textualism as originalism, see Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The
Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). For further distinct emphasis on the
constitutional doctrine of textualism and related judicial tests, see Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 486-87 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring). For a
rather different, more general defense of the Constitution as a document, as opposed to
judicial doctrine, see Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114
HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000).
197 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 998 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he text of the
Constitution, and our traditions, say what they say and there is no fiddling with
them.").
. Id.
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the constitutional level, Justice Scalia appeals to "legislative
history," " presumably in search of some version of original
intent."'
More generally, textualists are inclined to "overrule"
what they take to be the evident meaning of a text in order to
avoid what the textualist - on some grounds other than
textualism - considers a bizarre or absurd result. 2 Textualists
supplement, if not displace or reverse, the text with"propositions of policy, morality, and experience."0 2  Much
policy, morality, and experience will bear only an indirect
relation to any rival, non-textualist constitutional theory, but
much will be central to and depend crucially on one or more
natural law or natural rights theories.'" In this final respect,
then, textualism will again be dependent on its own rival
views.
D. Original Intent-Oriented Theories
The next theory or family of theories in the dependency
continuum is Originalism. Original intent-oriented theories of
199 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) ("Because there
is no constitutional text speaking to this precise question, the answer . . . must be
sought in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution,
and in the jurisprudence of this Court.").
200 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown Ideal?, 96
MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1515 (1998); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37
UCLA L. REV. 621, 625 (1990) ("Justice Scalia himself uses legislative history when
interpreting the Constitution.").
201 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the
Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1136 (1998) (McConnell sympathetically states,
"Justice Scalia . . . interprets the text in light of three supplemental jurisprudential
principles: originalism, traditionalism, and restraint.").
202 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 13, 27
(1995).
203 See id. at 28.
204 See infra Part II.F. One cannot avoid the problem of justifying reliance on
a constitutional text by announcing that such a text, once it is somehow identified and
distinguished from mere pretender texts, just is the self-evident, indemonstrable, rock-
bottom foundation of constitutional law. But see Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect
Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 383 (1981) (critiquing Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 225 (1980)).
One could hold that the written Constitution is or is not morally legitimate generally,
or with regard to particular groups of persons, either because of the process by which
the Constitution was adopted, or because of the document's substantive moral
character. On such a view, the text, and textualist interpretations, might well require
supplementation by a deeper contractarian or natural law and natural rights
constitutional theory. For background, see Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism For
Nonoriginalists, 46 LOy. L. REV. 611, 639-41 (1999).
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constitutional decisionmaking take many forms,"5 including
some forms that are barely, if at all, distinguishable from a
form of textualism.' Given the mutual relationships and
dependencies among some forms of textualism and originalism,
it is fair to ask why we have ranked textualism as, in general,
more dependent upon its rival theories than originalism.
Originalism can for our purposes be viewed as an
attempt to provide necessary underpinnings, or an underlying
logic, for textualism. In particular, originalism serves as an
attempt to answer why we should be bound by a text, or by this
text in particular. Any text can label itself, or be labeled by a
person, as a "constitution." Any text can expressly insist that it
is binding in all respects on all persons under all times and
circumstances."7 Originalism offers an answer, adequate or
inadequate, to this sort of problem that cannot be resolved by
appeal to the text itself.
As it turns out, however, the major forms of originalism
are at worst unsuccessful or unnecessary in validating the
constitutional text,'0 and at best dependent upon rival
contractualist views, °9 which are in turn dependent upon rival
natural law or natural rights views.2 " It is possible, however, to
develop an originalist theory that bypasses dependence upon a
205 See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash, Overcoming the Constitution, 91 GEO. L.J.
407 (2003) (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., OVERCOMING THE CONSTITUTION
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001) (distinguishing originalism as a method of
interpreting the Constitution versus originalism as the Framers' actual Constitution
with all its defects); Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive
Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1766 (1997)
(strict originalism versus moderate or high level abstraction-of-intention orginalism);
James E. Fleming, Original Meaning Without Originalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1849, 1854
(1997) ("ancestral" or traditionalist origi~alism versus "heroic" or "aspirational"
originalism); Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of
Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669, 676-77 (1991) (distinguishing, as in
contract law, between objective or public principled meaning originalism and subjective
actual intentions orginalism).
20o See, e.g., Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 488, 491 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("We should be guided ... by the Census
Clause's original meaning, for the Constitution is a written instrument. As such its
meaning does not alter. That which it meant when adopted, it means now.") (internal
quotations omitted) (ultimately quoting South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437,
448 (1905)).
207 Just as, by way of analogy, a written contract might by its own express
terms insist that no signatory was under duress, or a will might expressly assert that
the testator was under no constraint. The question of duress or constraint cannot, of
course, be so easily suppressed.
208 See infra Part IIE-F.
209 See infra the remainder of Part II.D.
210 See infra Part II.E.
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contractualist constitutional theory, and that instead depends
solely upon some sort of natural law or natural rights-based
approach to the Constitution. But historically, originalist
theories commonly depend on constitutional contractualist
theories,21' which in turn depend more directly on natural law
or natural rights-based constitutional theories.2
Originalist theories of constitutional decisionmaking
have been assessed in a remarkably broad range of ways,
running from accusations of near incoherence or impossibility12
to winning credit for distinctively upholding the values of
judicial restraint21 ' and democratic legitimacy.215 Our primary
interest, however, is not in an overall assessment of the merits
of any form of originalism. Rather, this section addresses the
nature and extent of originalism's dependencies on rival
normative theories of constitutional decisionmaking.
First, let us bypass some complications. Assume that we
can identify who counts, or whose intentions count, and how
much, for original intent purposes. 1' Merely for the sake of
211 See infra the remainder of Part II.D.
211 See infra Part II.E.
213 See, e.g., Paul Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 661-62 (1985)
(on the impossibility of a narrow, strict, literal, author-determined originalism, as
opposed to a moderate, hermeneutic, or reader-contributory originalism). See also
Robert W. Bennett, The Mission of Moral Reasoning in Constitutional Law, 58 S. CAL.
L. REV. 647, 648 (1985) ("Originalism is, if not exactly incoherent, an utterly
impoverished way of thinking about constitutional law. While many serious scholars
consider themselves originalists, none actually embraces the dogma in the artificial
form that might make it coherent."). See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A
Guide For the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085, 1087 (1989) (raising the possibility for
discussion that "originalism is inherently self-contradictory because the original intent
was that judges would not use originalism"). See also Michael Moore, Originalist
Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 364, 367 (1988)
(referring to the argument that "you could not possibly find the framers' intentions,
even if you wanted to"). See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism,
and the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 845 (1991) ("As
modern political and interpretive theories rightly and constantly claim, we will never
know the intent of the legislature."). But see generally E.D. HIRSCH, JR., THE AIMS OF
INTERPRETATION 8 (1976) (In general, "[t]he reader should try to reconstruct the
authorial meaning, and he can in principle succeed in this attempt."). For a response to
Hirsch, see Eagleton, supra note 193, at 60 ("Hirschian theory is quite unable to justify
its own ruling values.").
214 See infra note 222 and accompanying text.
215 See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
216 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Are Mental States Relevant For Statutory and
Constitutional Interpretation?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1609, 1641-42 (2000) (raising basic
problems of concept and classification). See also Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 839
(2d Cir. 1991) (taxpayer Establishment Clause case) ("[Ilt is perilous to speak of an
overall 'intent' of the Framers as if they were a cohesive group. One historical fact is
clear: the Bill of Rights was demanded by the party that opposed the document as a
whole.").
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convenience, we will refer to this group, including framers,
ratifiers, commentators, or other persons, merely as "framers."
Further assume that we can identify some actual or even
hypothetical intention - concrete and specific, or abstract and
general - held by those identified framers.2" We must then
distinguish between the kind of original intent that we might
call a substantive or first-order intent, and an original intent
that qualifies as a higher-order or meta-intent."'8
Conceivably, for example, a framer of the Fourteenth
Amendment may have had not only narrower and broader
understandings of the Equal Protection Clause,1 ' but a complex
and important layering of intentions bearing upon racial
discrimination loosely akin to the multiple layering of
intentions a smoker might have toward smoking. Someone
might genuinely intend a discriminatory interpretation of a
constitutional provision, while at another level genuinely
reject, be ashamed of, or intend to repudiate such a
discriminatory interpretation. And one could at another level of
intention also identify with, be proud of, and seek to strengthen
those latter, higher-order intentions.
Perhaps even more importantly, a framer of a
constitutional provision can, logically, hold any of a wide range
of intentions specifically regarding whether her own intentions
regarding that provision should be legally binding on future
actors. Someone can strongly intend that a provision have a
217 See Moore, supra note 213, at 367 (posing the question of such intention's
ascertainability). For discussion of the Framers' expectation that some originally
indeterminate constitutional meanings would become more determinate over time via
judicial decisions, see Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 519, 521 (2003). For discussion of the broader problem of indeterminacy at
the level of originally intended principles, see Perry, supra note 205, at 710-17. See
also Joseph Biancalana, Originalism and the Commerce Clause, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 383
(2002) (distinguishing between the "occasional" original authorial intent and the
timeless original meaning of constitutional textual words, phrases, and sentences).
"" For a discussion in a much more general context of desires, preferences,
and intentions, see Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a
Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5, 13-17 (1971). As a general illustration, we can often detect at
least three levels of preference or intention with regard to one's cigarette smoking. A
person may have a first order substantive desire and intention to smoke, but a second-
order, meta-desire or intention generally to give up smoking. At a third-order level, the
person in question may be proud of, identify with, and want and intend to strengthen
and persist in the second-order desire or intention to quit.
219 As suggested by Professor Ronald Dworkin's distinction between a broader
constitutional "concept" and a narrower, more concrete and specific constitutional"conception." See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1977). See also
Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1067 (1981)
(discussing specific versus broader framer intentions); Perry, supra note 205, at 681-83
(focusing on the level of ratifier principle).
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favored meaning for the present generation. Such a person may
also seek to bind some or all future generations to the same
intended meaning."2 But the same person may affirmatively
intend not to bind future generations to that same meaning,221
or may have no intention in the matter, whether from
ambivalence, lack of foresight, conscious indifference, or failure
to think of future generations at all. 2
An originalist theorist today must consider all the
possibilities. An originalist who believes the framers intended
to bind us to their substantive constitutional intentions cannot,
merely on that basis, conclude that we really are normatively
bound for just that reason. That the framers intended to bind
us does not mean that we are or should be so bootstrappingly
bound." Some further argument is obviously needed. But on
the other hand, it is possible that we properly should consider
ourselves bound by the framers' substantive constitutional
intent even if they did not wish to bind us. There may be
legitimate reasons for us to feel bound by their substantive
intent that the framers themselves did not fully appreciate.24
Substantively, originalists offer a family of related
reasons why we should feel bound by the framers' intentions.
220 See, e.g., Johnathan G. O'Neill, Raoul Berger and the Restoration of
Originalism, 96 Nw. U.L. REV. 253, 275 (2001) (discussing Berger's argument that "the
framers . . . regarded the Constitution as a special kind of statute or contract"
legitimized via ratification and then interpreted per framer intent).
221 See, e.g., Paul F. Campos, A Text Is Just a Text, 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY
327, 332-33 (1996); Farber, supra note 213, at 1087. See also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 807 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that growth in scope of interstate
commerce, and of congressional regulatory power thereunder, was unforeseeable to
constitutional Framers).
222 See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARv. L. REV. 885, 888 (1985) ("Only later, during the breakdown of the Republican
consensus, did the attention of constitutional interpreters gradually shift from the
'intention' of the sovereign states to the personal intentions of individual historical
actors."); Steven D. Smith, The Writing of the Constitution and the Writing on the Wall,
19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 391,399 (1996).
223 See H. Jefferson Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1532 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE
FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)) (purporting the Framers' intent that later interpreters be
intentionalists as merely a circular justification for intentionalism).
224 Perhaps revolutionary Framers, though not our general superiors,
outshone us in sheer revolutionary fervor, a fact that they, in their modesty or
optimism regarding the future, did not anticipate. See Larry Simon, The Authority of
the Constitution and its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 645-46 (1985) (emphasizing time discounting as
distinct from the multiplying unforeseen circumstances of the distant future); Campos,
supra note 221, at 332-33 (discussing grounds for modesty in seeking to impose
particular constitutional intentions on unenvisionable circumstances two centuries
later).
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One theme is the desire to constrain judicial arbitrariness and
subjectivity. Achieving this goal is thought to require a
touchstone reference to original intent. Justice Scalia has set
forth this theme in the following terms:
[Tihe main danger in judicial interpretation of the Constitution ...
is that judges will mistake their own predilections for the law. Non-
originalism, which under one or another formulation invokes
fundamental values as the touchstone of constitutionality, plays
precisely to this weakness. It is very difficult for a person to discern
a difference between those political values that he personally thinks
most important, and those political values that are fundamental to
our society."'
Justice Scalia does not argue that a sincerely practiced
originalism precludes all judicial subjectivity.2"' Judges tend to
read their own values into those of the framers.27 The idea is
instead that serious inquiry into framer intent is more likely to
reduce judicial subjectivity than is an inquiry into a society's
"fundamental values." 28
Reducing judges' subjective discretion is linked to what
are called the instrumentalist as well as the non-
instrumentalist or legitimacy values claimed for originalism.
Instrumentally, originalism is thought to promote the virtues
of "stability, predictability, and clarity," "9 as well as to reduce
unnecessary risk and uncertainty." Non-instrumentally,
225 Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863
(1989).
21 See id. at 864. For some evidence that an originalist approach, as distinct
from conventional political ideology, does not have much independent power to
constrain or direct the originalist judge's votes, see Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A.
Segal, An Original Look at Originalism, 36 LAw & SoC'Y REV. 113 (2002). This would
seem to complicate any originalist claim that originalism limits subjectivity, where
contractarian and natural law theories would in contrast supposedly give full scope to
subjectivity.
227 See Scalia, supra note 225, at 864.
21 See id. See also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 252 (1990)
(asserting that "[t]he principles of the actual Constitution make the judges' major
moral choices for him"). According to Judge Bork, it is only once the judge sets aside or
must go beyond the Constitution that "he is at once adrift on an uncertain sea of moral
argument." Id. See also Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 723 (1988) ("For the Court, originalism
seemingly provides a legitimate ground for decisionmaking."). Professor Monaghan
joins Justice Scalia in acknowledging some legitimate and independent role for
established judicial precedent. See Scalia, supra note 225, at 864-86; Monaghan, supra
at 724, 772-73.
229 Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalism, 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 283, 286 (1996).
230 See Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions In Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U.L. REV. 226, 290-91 (1988)
[Vol. 70:1
DEPENDENCE AND HIERARCHY
originalism is thought to be linked with democratic legitimacy.
Thus, originalism is said to be based crucially on the idea that:
The Constitution is supreme law because it rests on the direct
imprimatur of a sovereign people, expressed through the
extraordinary procedures required for ratification; and its original
meaning, accordingly, prevails over the lesser acts of legislators and
the preferences of jurists.' 3'
If everything that constitutional originalism claims
about itself is true, does constitutional originalism then
amount to a genuinely self-sufficient, independent theory of
constitutional decisionmaking? As it turns out, while
originalism may underlie alternative theories such as
textualism, 3' originalism in turn requires crucial foundational
recourse to other, more basic, constitutional theories.
Originalists commonly dilute or compromise pure
originalism by providing some role for precedent-based
theories. But this is literally a matter of supplementation, in
order to add to the appeal of the originalist theory, rather than
of more deeply explaining or justifying originalism itself. The"upward" recourse to precedent takes some of the edge off an
otherwise narrow devotion to original intent. Thus, almost
every originalist would adulterate that theory with the doctrine
of stare decisis - so that Marbury v. Madison would stand even
if Professor Raoul Berger should demonstrate unassailably that
it got the meaning of the Constitution wrong." Professor Henry
Monaghan holds further that "Brown's departure from the
original understanding was not only defensible, but was
probably the Supreme Court's only legitimate response to the
nation's escalating moral and social turmoil."'
("The need for some minimum degree of stability can be seen by the fact that nearly
everyone agrees that some constitutional provisions require judges to follow the
evidently intended meaning."). These instrumental virtues are, no doubt, obtainable to
some degree on other constitutional approaches, including precedent-based theories in
particular.
231 Jack N. Rakove, The Original Intention of Original Understanding, 13
CONST. COMMENT. 159, 161 (1996). See also H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists,
73 VA. L. REV. 659, 660 (1987) (using originalism to argue that "antimajoritarian
judicial review is legitimate only when it can be shown to rest not on judicial choice but
on the ratification or amendment process"); Farber, supra note 213, at 1085-98; Susan
Burgess, A Fine Romance: Keith Whittington's Originalism and the Drama of U. S.
Constitutional Theory, 35 LAW & Socfy REV. 931, 932-33 (2001).
232 See supra text accompanying notes 205-07.
233 Scalia, supra note 225, at 861, 864-65. See also Monaghan, supra note 228,
at 724, 772-73 (discussing the status of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954)).
234 See Monaghan, supra note 228, at 772.
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Even here, though, the originalist may be traveling in
two directions - upward for the appeal of a precedent or two,
and, less obviously, downward for the foundational support of
constitutional contractualist and a natural law or natural
rights theory. Consider Brown v. Board of Education" in
particular. Can we really even begin to explain why Brown was
the only legitimate response to moral turmoil236 by pointing to
some case precedent that supports Brown better than does an
appeal to the original intent of the framers of the Equal
Protection Clause? Does the value of precedent combined with
originalism fully explain why we would not overrule Brown
today, let alone why Brown was rightly decided at the time? 7
This is not to suggest that originalists should ignore the
value of precedent and settled expectations3. for the sake of
theoretical purity. Instead, the point is that the crucial
departures from pure originalism cannot be fully explained as"upward" appropriations of the value of precedent. The appeal
of Brown, initially or as an established precedent, for the
originalist must crucially lie elsewhere. In part, this appeal is
better understood as a matter of some sort of broad contract or
natural law/natural rights approach. Doubtless the intended
point of much originalism is precisely to avoid the assumed
uncertainties and subjective manipulability of contract or
natural law/natural rights theory. But even the conscious
desire of originalists to avoid the latter approaches does not
mean that originalists can escape logically relying on them in
fact."" Originalism is not a serious candidate for a self-
contained, free-standing constitutional theory apart from any
recourse to the latter, more "fundamental" constitutional
theories. That some group of persons identified as framers
clearly intended in writing for us to do something hardly begins
to justify why we should now do what they intended.
235 See 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
236 See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
237 Of course, any "original intent plus precedent" theory must take some
account of Brown's effective overruling of the broad precedent of Plessy v. Ferguson,
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
m See generally supra Part II.B and, for the influence of originalism on the
theory of precedent, text accompanying notes 120-24.
M9 We may take Justice Scalia's desire to avoid "fundamental values"
jurisprudence as encompassing these approaches. See supra text accompanying note
225.
140 See infra Part IIE-F.
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It is hardly surprising, then, that originalist theory is
commonly ambivalent toward contractarian and natural
law/natural rights theories. The best and most obvious
explanations of why intent matters to originalists will actually
depend on some contractarian or natural law/natural rights
theory.2 1 We shall argue below that such contractarian theory
itself requires in turn some sort of natural law/natural rights
foundation.2 2 Contemporary originalists must address not only
the basic problem of the logical dependencies of originalist and
then of contract theories, but the narrower problem of the
extent to which the framers allowed for and perhaps required
an enforceable natural law or natural rights theory.243 Consider,
more concretely, Professor Raoul Berger's important assertion,
following that of Chief Justice Marshall,2" that the
constitutional powers of the federal government are limited,2 45
and that those limits are not to be transcended.2 ' No doubt this
is a familiar claim. But the familiarity of a claim does not make
it a self-justifying claim. Nor does the claim to limited as
241 See O'Neill, supra note 220, at 275. While Raoul Berger among others may
have tried to avoid relying, at least directly, on natural law or natural rights theories;
the attempt to avoid any logical dependence on such theories cannot be guaranteed any
success. See id. at 255-56. See also Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and
Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765,
1767 (1997) (referring to "the social contract theory that I believe underlies both strict
and moderate originalism"); Stephen Macedo, Morality and the Constitution: Towards
a Synthesis for "Earthbound" Interpreters, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 29, 29 (1992) ("Reliance
on something like natural law is much more difficult to avoid than proponents of
original intent, such as Raoul Berger, would have us believe."); David A. J. Richards,
Originalism Without Foundations, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373, 1391 (1990) (reviewing
ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990)) (referring to Bork's unwillingness to
allow any "serious role for political and moral philosophy in constitutional theory"). But
see Lawrence Lessig, The Puzzling Persistence of Bell Bottom Theory: What a
Constitutional Theory Should Be, 85 GEO. L.J. 1837, 1837 (1997) (rejecting the idea
that social contract or any other theory "underlies" orginalism or any constitutional
practice).
See infra Part II.E.
243 See, e.g., Farber, supra note 213, at 1092 ("[B]elief in the existence of an
unwritten 'higher law' continued until well into the nineteenth century. Some writers
argue that the Framers accepted natural law as a judicially enforceable restriction on
governmental power."); Suzanna Sherry, Original Sin, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 1215, 1224
(1990) (reviewing ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990)) (discussing the
historical evidence regarding the view among framers and ratifiers "that unwritten
natural law constituted a limit on legislative powers," citing in particular Ninth
Amendment historical scholarship). See also Kmiec, supra note 165, at 628 ("It is
natural law and the natural rights derived therefrom that affirm and secure the
Constitution's original meaning.").
244 See Raoul Berger, Reflections on Constitutional Interpretation, 1997 BYU
L. REV. 517, 517 (1997).
245 Id.
246 Id.
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opposed to unlimited federal power, in its modesty, become self-
justifying.
A substantive claim by originalists for a limited federal
constitutional government cannot be justified in originalist and
other, non-constitutional terms. Instead, seeing the
Constitution as a valid and binding contract where the relevant
parties have, without injustice to others, freely and fairly
agreed upon a limited federal government,4 ' allows for genuine
progress in the argument. And the nature of any valid and
binding such contract will, in turn, depend crucially upon
notions of natural law and natural rights.
E. Contractarian Theories
Given the basic dependencies of textualism on
originalism and, in turn, of originalism on some form of
constitutional contractarianism, it is not surprising that some
claim that "the fundamental theory of political legitimacy in
the United States is contractarian . . . ."" This section will
suggest, however, that constitutional contractarianism cannot
establish its moral standing and legitimacy merely by pointing
to some set of historical events not constitutive of rival
constitutional theories.
247 Admittedly, for purposes related mainly to social stability, we may care as
much about whether a historical contract is now perceived as fair than about whether
it actually was fair. In directing us to both these concerns, the word "legitimacy" is
ambiguous. For an emphasis on legitimacy and perception, See Richard S. Kay,
"Originalist" Values and Constitutional Interpretation, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 335,
337 (1996). To some extent, a contract theory might link public perceptions and moral
realities if a judge or legislator who takes an oath to uphold the Constitution happens
to interpret that oath as referring to the Constitution as it is popularly understood. But
while the taking of an oath can indeed sometimes alter the moral environment, it
seems possible to in good conscience take an oath to uphold the Constitution
understood on one theory, even if the oath-taker knows that much of the general public
disapproves of that theory. The role of the oath is probably under-emphasized in most
comprehensive theories of constitutional decisionmaking. The oath is discussed,
however, in Barnett, supra note 204, at 651; Easterbrook, supra note 190, at 1122.
'4 Easterbrook, supra note 190, at 1121. See also Anita L. Allen, Social
Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1999) ("[Tlhe idea of the
social contract as a source of legitimate and consensual authority has surfaced in
constitutional . . . cases in this century and the last."); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 419, 455 (1793). While textualism, originalism, and social contract theory can
variously overlap, each can also be distinguished. Certainly social contract theory can
be naturally interpreted to yield a theory (or theories) of constitutional interpretation.
An obvious such approach might claim that the Constitution means X, or requires
judicial outcome Y, because that is what the relevant public has agreed to by means of
the social contract. Social contract theories of constitutional interpretation may include
emphasis on, while still somehow transcending, the text of the Constitution, or what
the original constitutional drafters had in mind.
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The genuine moral bindingness of any sort of contract,
constitutional or otherwise, depends upon judgments about the
parties and about their freedom, knowledge, and power under
the circumstances at the time of contracting. Only up to a
certain point can contract theory itself determine what
constitutes a valid and binding contract. The necessary further
considerations are, broadly speaking, largely a matter of
recourse to central elements of natural law or natural rights
theories.
Indeed, the generation of the framers and their
successors often thought of constitutional matters in
contractualist or "social compact".49 terms, influenced at least
indirectly by the great social contract tradition in philosophy."
Social or constitutional contract theory is thus well represented
explicitly within at least the early ages of American
constitutional law.
Contractarian theory, however, does not construct itself
automatically, independent of value choices and external
249 See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876) ("A body politic,' as aptly
defined in the preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, 'is a social compact by
which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole
people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.'"); id. ("State
constitutions, or other forms of the social compact, undertook to give practical effect to
such as they deemed necessary for the common good and the security of life and
property."); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 (1967) ("Due process . . . is the basic and
essential term in the social compact which defines the rights of the individual and
delimits the powers which the state may exercise."); Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451,
467, 478 (2001) (Scalia, Stevens, Thomas, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting) ("Madison wrote
that 'ex post facto laws ... are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and
to every principle of social legislation.') (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 44, 282 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 533
(1998) ("In his Commentaries on the Constitution, Justice Story reasoned:
'Retrospective laws are, indeed, generally unjust; and as has been forcibly said, neither
accord with sound legislation nor with the fundamental principles of the social
compact.") (quoting 2 JUSTICE STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1398 (5"'
ed. 1898)); Kaiser Aluminum v. Bonjorna, 494 U.S. 827, 840, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (quoting Justice Story from the 1851 edition). See also the view of Justice
Chase in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) ("The purposes for which men
enter into society will determine the nature and terms of the social compact; and as
they are the foundation of the legislative power, they will decide what are the proper
objects of it.").
250 Beyond the basic contractarian theory classically developed by Thomas
Hobbes, John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau and others, the worthy and easily
accessible commentary includes PATRICK RILEY, WILL AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY
(1982); C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM
(1962); HOBBES AND ROUSSEAU: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL ESSAYS (Maurice Cranston
& Richard S. Peters eds., 1972); THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORISTS (Christopher W.
Morris ed., 1999); LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON LOCKE'S POLITICAL IDEAS
(Gorden J. Schochet ed., 1971); Hanna Pitkin, Obligation and Consent, 59 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 990 (1965).
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rational and normative standards."' Choices must be made in
the course of developing any such theory, and the choices must
be justified in rational and moral terms. As one writer
formulates the main options:
Social contract views differ according to how the idea of agreement is
specified: Who are the parties to the agreement? How are they
situated with respect to one another (status quo, state of nature, or
equality)? What are the intentions, capacities, and interests of these
individuals, and what rights and powers do they have? What is the
purpose of the agreement?25
Without at least implicit answers to these questions
there simply is no social or constitutional contract theory. And
answering these questions requires thinking at some
significant moral depth, and almost inescapably, consideration
of some sort of natural law or natural rights theory.
Even the most familiar non-constitutional domestic
contract law must somehow answer these questions. Ordinary
contract law tries to partially address some of the above
questions through contract law doctrines such as duress and
unconscionability.u Unconscionability, in its procedural or
substantive respects," limits what counts not only as a morally
appealing contract, but even as a legally binding and
enforceable contract."
The idea of contractual conscionability is not reducible
to a concise formula.25 A number of the major considerations,
however, seem readily applicable to the special context of a
constitutional contract. Whether a contract is unconscionable
may depend, for example, on the "relative bargaining power""7
or the "inequality of bargaining or economic power" ' of the
251 See generally JEAN HAMPTON, THE AUTHORITY OF REASON 204-06 (Richard
Healey ed., 1998) (exploring instrumental rationality and its dependence on normative
principles that influence one's choices).
211 Samuel Freeman, Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views, 19
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 122, 122 (1990).
For background on ordinary contractual unconscionablity, see JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 4-2 to 4-7, at 153-69
(5th ed. 2000); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967). For a leading case, see Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
See, e.g., NEC Techs. v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 769, 771-72 (Ga. 1996).
25 See id. at 771.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 772.
State v. DVM Enters., 62 P.3d 653, 658 (Kan. 2003) (quoting Willie v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 907 (Kan. 1976)).
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parties. The courts also consider the possible "exploitation of
the underprivileged, unsophisticated, uneducated, and the
illiterate."... The courts look finally to "the presence or absence
of a meaningful choice.""
We may assume that exclusion from the contractual
negotiating process of some groups who are nonetheless
claimed to be bound by the results of the process could count as
an extreme case of the considerations above. One's choice may
not be meaningful, and one may be subject to exploitation, if
one's participation in the contractual bargaining process is
either nonexistent or limited and indirect at best. These sorts
of considerations bear on the American constitutional drafting,
negotiation, and ratification process.
Our point in applying the broader contractual
unconscionability model is not to show whether the
Constitution, as a contract, is actually morally or legally
binding on anyone." ' Nor is it to show whether any such result
speaks for or against the constitutional contract model on the
merits. Rather, the idea is to emphasize how contractual
considerations inevitably merge into and depend crucially upon
underlying moral considerations most readily thought of in
broadly natural law or natural rights terms. Ideas such as lack
of meaningful choice, of exploitation, and of oppression..2 are
explained and justified not solely, if at all, with contractualist
theory. These elements must be explained on broadly natural
law or natural rights theory. We simply do not know how to
meaningfully weigh, balance, or otherwise apply the various
unconscionability factors in the absence of something like the
latter, deeper sort of theory.
Consider how constitutional contract theory would
inescapably rely on natural law/natural rights theory in
assessing some of the critique classically associated with
Charles Beard." Let us assume Beard to have argued, roughly,
that the constitutional drafting and ratification process was
exclusionary on a group basis, rather than being democratically
259 Id.
26 NEC Techs. v. Nelson, 478 S.E.2d 769, 772 (Ga. 1996) (citing Schroeder v.
Fageol Motors, 544 P.2d 20, 23 (Wash. 1975)).
21 For discussion of some related issues in a broader context, see generally R.
GEORGE WRIGHT, DOES THE LAW MORALLY BIND THE POOR? (1996).
262 See NEC Techs., 478 S.E.2d at 772.
26 See CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES (1913).
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inclusionary.2 Securing the assumed property rights of a
minority trumped the participatory interests of disenfranchised
and unrepresented groups amounting to a numerical
majority." Similarly, it has more recently been argued that:
The Constitution received far from overwhelming consent even from
those who participated or were eligible to participate, much less from
the eighty percent of the population that was ineligible. The
autonomy and Pareto values that underlie consent theory simply
cannot justify binding the dissenters or the disenfranchised (let
alone later generations) to the will of the clique that prevailed."
More concretely, "[tihe Constitution was adopted by
propertied white males who had no strong incentives to attend
to the concerns and interests of the impoverished, the
nonwhites, or nonmales who were alive then, much less those
of us alive today....
There are several possible ways of responding to such
historical arguments, beyond concluding that contract theory
leaves relatively few current American citizens legitimately
26 See generally id. at 324-35. For critique mainly at a level of detail beyond
our interests herein, see, e.g., FORREST MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1958); Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic Views
of the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 52 (1987) (referring to the "glaring
errors" of Beard's nonetheless "important" work); Neil K. Komesar, Paths of Influence -
Beard Revisited, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 124 (1987); Shlomo Slonim, Motives at
Philadelphia, 1787: Gordon Wood's Neo-Beardian Thesis Re-Examined, 16 L. & HIST.
REV. 527 (1998) (examining the collected relevant work of Gordon Wood).
215 See BEARD, supra note 263, at 324-35. For a contemporary normative
slant, see ROBERT A. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION? 2
(2003).
Why should we feel bound today by a document produced more than two
centuries ago by a group of fifty-five mortal men, actually signed by only
thirty-nine, a fair number of whom were slave holders and adopted in only
thirteen states by the votes of fewer than two thousand men, all of whom are
long since dead and mainly forgotten?
Id.
26 Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can
Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1482, 1498 (1985). Simon
rejects as irrelevant at this level the argument that yesterday's losers are just as likely
to be tomorrow's winners. See id.
27 Id. at 1499. See also Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 111, 123 (2003) (discussing historical circumstances); Gene R. Nichol,
Toward a People's Constitution, 91 CAL. L. REV. 621, 634 (2003) ("The deliberations of
1787 included no meaningful debate between the haves and the have-nots."); Vine
Deloria, Jr., Minorities and the Social Contract, 20 GA. L. REV. 917, 918-20 (1986)
(discussing the relative narrowness of the conception of the social contract informing
the Framers' views). But cf McConnell, supra note 201, at 1132-33 (1998) (discussing a
"traditionalist" response positing subsequent broad "implicit" consent to or ratification
of the Constitution).
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bound." But there is inescapably a limit to the ability of any
contract theory to justify itself on its own internal resources.
Familiar sorts of contract theory cannot by themselves suffice
to choose among alternative contractual approaches to the
basic contractual issues noted above.6 9 More simply put,
contract theory alone cannot choose among the possible
varieties of contract theory.
Thus social contract theory must appeal beyond itself
for crucial definitional meaning and justification, particularly
in cases where some of the bargainers have obtained resources
and other bargaining advantages in ways that may not be
morally justifiable. Criteria for distinguishing just from unjust
advantages are therefore necessary, lest the latter unjust
advantages translate themselves into the substance of any
eventual contract. One obvious and general way to sort just
from unjust, or justly acquired from unjustly acquired,
advantages is at least partly through some rival natural
law/natural rights theory.
Given the history of the contracting group, setting these
morally permissible baselines certainly cannot be a matter
entirely internal to social or constitutional contract theory
itself. Consider, for example, that one's bargaining power could
be partly a result of one's "personal" qualities. It is difficult,
though, to entirely separate personal qualities from one's
general stock of resources, assets, or advantages affecting one's
ability to bargain. Such resources help to make us who we are.
And what we have could have been obtained in morally
objectionable or unobjectionable ways.
The modern contract theorist James M. Buchanan notes
that "[p]hysical strength, cajolery, stealth - all these and other
personal qualities might determine the relative abilities of the
268 See, e.g., A. John Simmons, Consent, Free Choice, and Democratic
Government, 18 GA. L. REV. 791, 793 (1984); John Kilcullen, Locke On Political
Obligation, 45 REV. POL. 323 (1983) (critiquing the contractarian elements in Locke's
influential theory).
269 See supra text accompanying notes 251-56. One might wonder, however,
whether natural law or natural right theories are in the same sense self-justifying and
thus self-sufficient, or how one chooses among particular versions of such a theory. It is
probably fair to say that typical well-developed natural law/natural rights theories can
indeed make more progress in justifying themselves by logic internal to such theories
than contract theory can justify itself in contract terms. But even if not, the crucial
justification for typical natural law/natural rights theories would involve an appeal to
an understanding of matters such as human nature, personhood, the world, and the
universe. These broad matters do not themselves amount to or lend themselves more
directly to any rival theory of normative constitutional decisionmaking.
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individuals to secure and protect for themselves quantities of
[some good] . .. 0 These personal qualities, however, are
largely and in various ways social in their origin. They are not
simply bestowed genetically, or received as random natural
endowments. One's bargaining strength or ability to "hold out"
may reflect the various legitimate and illegitimate ways in
which one, or one's family, has already interacted with others.
The social or constitutional contract theorist plainly
cannot afford to validate every past moral transgression,
including forcible wealth transfers, by allowing the contractual
bargaining to proceed on the basis of the current distribution of
resources. Allowing those who are properly classified as"predators" to retain, and to bargain upon the basis of, the
"fruits of predation"7 ' would set up disturbing pre-contract
behavioral incentives.72 Some more basic theory of rights to
underlie contract theory must be developed to distinguish what
one has by moral right from what one has by unjustifiable
predation, and to handle claims for rectification.
The contractualist may, in the end, wish to redress as
much injustice as possible in transactions and the distribution
of resources prior to any contractual bargaining.273 Or the
contractualist may decide that this rectification process,
beyond some point, becomes dubious and unduly costly. Even
more importantly, the contract theorist must, with the crucial
guidance of some natural law/natural rights theory, develop a
sense of what sorts of activities and advantages are illegitimate
and which are not. Should we count all force and fraud as
illegitimate? All coercion? How is coercion to be defined?74 Do
these considerations exhaust the realm of illegitimate
practices? Again, we need a "deeper" theory to provide the
270 JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND
LEVIATHAN 24 (1975).
27' DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 195 (1986).
272 See id. at 210. For the classic disagreement between John Rawls and
Robert Nozick on this point, compare JOHN RAWIS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 72 (1971)
(noting that undeserved assets are morally arbitrary) with ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE AND UTOPIA 206-07 (1974) (rejecting Rawls' position and its implications for
body part redistribution).
273 See GAUTHIER, supra note 271, at 201-02.
274 For an argument that Gauthier's understanding of"coercion" is too narrow,
for reasons not entirely encompassible within standard contract theory itself, see
James S. Fishkin, Bargaining, Justice, and Justification: Towards Reconstruction, in
THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS ON GAUTHIER 46, 47-49 (Ellen F. Paul et al. eds.,
1988) (citing instances of extractive or extortive windfalls, or "structural" coercion not
within the recognized scope of'coercion' in Gauthier's model).
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necessary answers. This "deeper" theory is generally the
natural law/natural rights rival approach to the decision of
constitutional cases.
The fundamental problem of "who counts" for
constitutional or social contracting purposes - children,
women, slaves, the unpropertied, future generations, or those
who cannot bargain - can admittedly be addressed partially
within the scope of contract theory.27 It is therefore necessary
to deepen and criticize.. any contractarian rules as to "who
counts," again largely by a deeper, rival theory.277 Loosely put,
justice and natural law/natural rights theories better explain
contract theory, of whatever sort, than contract theory,
including constitutional contract theory, explains justice."'
Put broadly, the best contemporary contract theories
would try to build upon what are hoped to be relatively
uncontroversial assumptions, but then develop the theory in
such a way as to logically result in interesting, more
controversial results. But as it turns out, the presuppositions of
contract theory must inescapably be interesting and
... See GAUTHIER, supra note 271, at 269, 270-01. A problem then remaining
for constitutional contract theory is that merely bringing women, slaves, and the
illiterate into the bargaining cannot validate the process if their choices would be based
upon an inadequate education. Education is really more presupposed by a free and fair
bargaining process, perhaps ultimately via the Fourteenth Amendment, than it is a
possible outcome, of a bargaining process. More simply, a constitutional contract
presupposes, rather than possibly generates, educational opportunity.
276 See David Braybrooke, Social Contract Theory's Fanciest Flight, 97 ETHICS
750, 756 (1987) (criticizing Gauthier's exclusion of people unable to contribute to the
cooperative surplus). See also id. at 755 (certain rights postulated by Gauthier as prior
to and apparently independent of any actual bargaining). Classically, the normative
role of popular consent to a constitution is logically dependent upon a pre-existing
natural right. See Hadley Arkes, The "Laws of Reason" and the Surprise of Natural
Law, in NATURAL LAW AND MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 146, 148 (E.F. Paul et al. eds.,
2001) (discussing John Locke); Sherry, supra note 152, at 1146.
277 Jean Hampton argued in the following "deeper" terms:
[Riegardless of whether or not one can engage in beneficial cooperative
interactions with another, one owes that person respectful treatment simply
in virtue of the fact that he is a person. Not all value is subjective; in
particular, the value which human beings have is objective, and demands
one's respect, whether that human being is an infant with whom one will
never have reason to cooperate, an elderly man past his prime, or an adult
whose talents one finds of no particular use.
Jean Hampton, Can We Agree On Morals?, 18 CAN. J. PHIL. 331, 352 (1988). On the
inability of Gauthier to avoid substantive moral commitments, see JEAN E. HAMPTON,
THE AUTHORITY OF REASON 206 (Richard Healey ed., 1998).
278 For a broadly parallel formulation, see CHRISTOPHER NORRIS, TRUTH
MATTERS 14 (2002). For the potentially greater capacity of contemporary, as opposed to
classical, theory for transparency and criticality, see Heidi L. Feldman, Rawls' Political
Constructivism As a Judicial Heuristic: A Response to Professor Allen, 51 FLA. L. REV.
67, 69 (1999).
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controversial. As a result, the unfolding of the constitutional or
other contracting process itself actually does little substantive
work. The built-in and typically controversial preliminary
assumptions do most of the heavy theoretical lifting, with any
subsequent bargaining process being largely redundant as far
as any interesting legal or moral result is concerned."
Generally, contemporary contract theories cannot shift the
focus of interest away from some form of underlying rival
natural law/natural rights theory and onto the bargaining
process itself, or any other distinctively contractual issue.
F. Particular Natural Law and Natural Rights-Oriented
Theories
Thus we arrive at the theory of constitutional
decisionmaking that is least practically and logically dependent
for its basic meaning and justification upon its own rival
constitutional theories. Although particularized natural
law/natural rights theories may in some respect depend on the
theories discussed above,' this dependency is for some of the"raw materials" of constitutional decisionmaking, rather than
for justification. There may well be a natural right to do things
that activate the rival theories, such as to enter into contracts.
Nor are natural law/natural rights theories independent of
facts about persons, circumstances, nature, and the world.
279 Professor Randy Barnett has illustrated the logic of dispensing with any
supposed need for a contractual consent requirement in cases where the rights-
protective character of a proposal is clear. See Barnett, supra note 267, at 142.
Professor Simon Blackburn more broadly points to redundancies in John Rawls' and
T.M. Scanlon's merely formally contractualist approaches to justice, where the real
work of sorting out the just and the unjust is done at stages prior to arrival at or
failure to arrive at a common set of principles by the parties to the contract. See Simon
Blackburn, Am I Right?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1999, at 24 (reviewing T.M. SCANLON,
WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998)). See also Colin McGinn, Reasons and
Unreasons, NEW REPUBLIC, May 24, 1999, at 34 (reviewing SCANLON, supra). But cf.
Philip Stratton-Lake, Scanlon's Contractualism and the Redundancy Objection, 63
ANALYSIS 70 (2003) (arguing that the "standard" redundancy objection is off the mark
in light of Scanlon's actual purposes). For discussion in a broader context, see Fred
D'Agostino, Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
contractarianism-contemporary (last modified Apr. 8, 2003).
Presumably a satisfactory natural law/natural rights approach, whatever
its deeper logic and more basic independence of other, rival theories, would want to
consider the established constitutional text, prior decisions creating settled
expectations, any promises made, and so on. Such considerations would, presumably,
enter into a result reached ultimately on deeper moral or logical grounds. Natural
law/natural rights theories generally need only "filling in" from rival views; rival views
need more basic justification, ultimately from natural law/natural right views.
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Obviously, the most plausible natural law or natural rights
theories must be rooted in the world as it is."'
The reference to "particular" natural law or natural
rights theories seeks to convey and emphasize the variety of
such theories. The category is intended to be inclusive, and not
confined to a constitutional theory derived from the particular
views of, say, Artistotle,"8 ' the Stoics," or Thomas Aquinas.'
We might refer instead simply to objective morality-based
theories of constitutional decisionmaking, emphasizing the
partially non-conventional and non-contractual nature of the
moral assertions made by this class of theories.28
The role of morality-based thinking in American
constitutionalism is subject to much debate. It is not much of
an exaggeration to say that many persons see "[aill that is good
and just"" as within the Constitution "while all that degrades
281 There would hardly be much point to basic rights to constitutional
protection from, say, assault, hunger, or enforced ignorance if nature were very
different, and we were all physically invulnerable, nutritionally self-sufficient, and
inherently fully educated from birth. Presumably natural rights can change, at some
level, with circumstances, reflecting our basic needs, vulnerabilities, and aspirations.
See, e.g., AQUINAS, supra note 101, at q. 98, a. 5. See also FRANCISCO DE VITORIA,
POLITICAL WRITINGS 157 (Anthony Pagden & Jeremy Lawrence eds., 1991)
(commenting on Aquinas, at q. 90, a. 2).
282 See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1134b (J.A.K. Thomson, trans.,
rev. ed. 1976) ("There are two sorts of political justice, one natural and the other legal.
The natural is that which has the same validity everywhere and does not depend upon
acceptance.").
283 See, e.g., MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH 215 (G. H.
Sabine & S. B. Smith trans., 1929) ("There is in fact a true law - namely, right reason-
which is in accordance with nature, applies to all men, and is unchangeable and
eternal.").
284 See, e.g., AQUINAS, supra note 101, at q. 94.
295 For a range of familiar definitions of "natural law," several of which seem
combinable for an especially broad understanding of the term, see Michael S. Moore,
Law As Justice, in NATURAL LAW AND MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 115, 115 (Ellen
Frankel Paul et al. eds., 2001) (referring to definitions focusing on moral objectivity,
human or non-human nature as normative, or to theistic bases for law and morality).
For a contemporary example of what is in some respects a broad understanding of
natural law theory, see generally DAVID BRAYBROOKE, NATURAL LAW MODERNIZED
(2001). For useful reviews of Braybooke, see Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law
Modernized, 111 MIND 833 (2002) (book review) and Anthony Duff, Natural Law
Modernized, 53 PHIL. Q. 628 (2003) (book review). Braybrooke enlists Rousseau and
Hume into the core natural law project as well. BRAYBROOKE, supra at 12. See also
MARK C. MURPHY, NATURAL LAW AND PRACTICAL RATIONALITY (2001) (developing a
natural law theory of "human flourishing" along narrower, traditionalist lines,
including Aristotelian functionalism). For a critique of Murphy, see Dudley Knowles,
Natural Law and Practical Rationality, 112 MIND 555 (2003) (book review).
'8 Gene R. Nichol, Toward A People's Constitution, 91 CAL. L. REV. 621, 621
(2003) (reviewing ROBERT A. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION? (2001)).
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and diminishes falls outside. " " To this extent, many persons
see the Constitution in directly moral terms. Some of the
constitutional case law even into the nineteenth century
reflects a directly moralized understanding of law and ofadjudication."
Professor Randy Barnett has made a contemporary
argument 8. that requires laws to be consistent with "the
background of natural rights retained by the people."'
Professor Barnett argues that neither the general public nor
the legislative process can optimally make such a
determination with regard to particular legislation, and it
therefore falls to an impartial judiciary to scrutinize legislation
for natural rights violations.2 ' Natural rights would thus at
least limit the scope of legitimate legislative action and
empower courts to give effect to those limits.
Professor Michael Perry has argued more generally that"constitutional judgment is a species of moral judgment:
Constitutional judgment is the moral judgment of the
'8' Id. See also Larry Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its
Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603,
618 (1985) (describing the Constitution as popularly authoritative because it is widely
thought to embody values of "democracy, freedom, equality, and justice").
28 Probably best known in this regard is the debate between Justices Chase
and Iredell in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). For a more unequivocal
endorsement some two decades later, see the opinion by Justice Story in United States
v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 846 (D. Mass. 1822):
Now in respect to the African slave trade . . . it is founded in a violation of
some of the first principles, which ought to govern nations. It is repugnant to
the great principles of Christian duty, the dictates of natural religion, the
obligations of good faith and morality, and the eternal maxims of social
justice. When any trade can be truly said to have these ingredients, it is
impossible, that it can be consistent with any system of law, that purports to
rest on the authority of reason or revelation. And it is sufficient to stamp any
trade as interdicted by public law, when it can be justly affirmed, that it is
repugnant to the general principles of justice and humanity.
Id. As Suzanna Sherry puts the matter, "The framers . . . intended courts to look
outside the Constitution in determining the validity of certain governmental actions,
specifically those affecting the fundamental rights of individuals." Sherry, supra note
152, at 1127.
299 Randy Barnett, Getting Normative: The Role of Natural Rights in
Constitutional Adjudication, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 93, 97 (1995).
291 Id. Professor Hamburger adds the clarification that "[1ate eighteenth-
century Americans typically assumed that natural rights, including the freedom of
speech and the press, were subject to natural law and that the laws of defamation,
obscenity, and fraud reflected natural law." Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights,
Natural Laws and American Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 913 (1993). See also
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 318-20 (1827) (Trimble, J.).
291 Michael J. Perry, Constitutional Judgment as Moral Judgment, 61 U.
COLO. L. REV. 803, 804 (1990).
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constitutional community . . . ."' Courts in particular, Perry
argues, have the advantages of political insulation, relative
disinterestedness, and a concrete as opposed to a merely
abstract presentation of the constitutional issues."
Joining Professor Perry, Professor Michael S. Moore
begins with nuanced originalist premises that do not merely
allow for, but require, conscious moral decisionmaking on the
part of constitutional interpreters.94 The framers, on Moore's
theory, had relevant intentions at various levels, including a
basic desire to avoid genuine moral error and to ascertain and
act on moral truth.9 Under Moore's theory, the framers
intended not only certain concrete, substantive understandings
of, for example, equal protection, but also sought and intended
to be genuinely right about such important matters. Today, we
may face a conflict between the framers' intention to validate,
say, public flogging as not cruel or unusual, assuming they
intended to bind us at all, and their presumably more basic
intention to actually accord with contemporary moral reality in
292 See generally id. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Moral Knowledge and
Constitutional Adjudication, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1501, 1511-13 (1989) (contribution to
symposium on MICHAEL J. PERRY'S MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAw (1988)). For
discussion of a "dropoff' in judicial constitutional enforcement of political justice
outside of certain rights contexts, see Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes:
Reflections On the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U.L. REV. 410, 410-11
(1993). For commentary on the defensibility of the enforcement "dropoff," see Terrance
Sandalow, Social Justice and Fundamental Law: A Comment on Sager's Constitution,
88 Nw. U.L. REV. 461, 461 (1993): "Conceptions of justice have, to be sure, informed
each generation's understanding of the Constitution, but that is a far cry from
supposing that the Constitution commands whatever justice requires." Compare Sager,
supra at 410-11 (arguing that "the Constitution does not even address the full range of
issues that are the subject of political justice.") with Mark Tushnet, Constitution-Talk
and Justice-Talk, 69 FORDHAM L, REV. 1999, 1999 (2001) (referring to "the justice-
seeking" conception of the Constitution as one "that takes establishing justice as a goal
for legislation and as a guide to the document's own interpretation," thus making the
Constitution and justice allegedly coincident, "so that an inquiry into the Constitution's
meaning is simultaneously, and indistinguishably, an inquiry into justice").
'9' See Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition, and Reason: A
Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation", 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 573-74, 592 (1985).
'9' See Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural Law Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2087 (2001) [hereinafter Moore, Justifying the
Natural Law Theory]. See also Michael S. Moore, Do We Have An Unwritten
Constitution?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 107 (1989) [hereinafter Moore, De We Have An
Unwritten Constitution?]. For a brief summary of some of Professor Moore's logic, see
John Harrison, Forms of Originalism and the Study of History, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POLVY 83, 92-94 (2003). For a statement of Professor Perry's originalism, as
distinguished from, among others, the originalism of Robert Bork, see Perry, supra
note 205.
25 See Moore, Justifying the Natural Law Theory, supra note 294, at 2093-96.
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their substantive judgment.2 " Moore therefore argues that "I do
not show proper fidelity to the text of the Constitution if I
construe it in accordance with the framers' definitions or
examples when I know those go against the actual nature of
the right to which those very framers referred." '7
Of course, others have been much less sympathetic to
any natural law or natural rights approach to constitutional
decisionmaking. Justice Hugo Black rejected what he referred
to as a natural law jurisprudence in connection with the Due
Process Clause," the Equal Protection Clause,' or the Bill of
Rights in general." Justice Black took his colleagues' presumed
natural law theorizing as an attack on the value of a written,
textual Constitution persisting over time. °1 In addition, Justice
Black was troubled by what he took to be the unconstrained,
arbitrary, subjective, "roaming" 2 quality of the natural law
method, as well as its implications for federalism and the
separation of powers."
Similar doubts about natural law/natural rights
reasoning in constitutional decisionmaking have been
expressed by Robert Bork. Bork recognizes that moral
296 See id. at 2095-96. For a discussion of the Framers' beliefs in this regard,
see Steven D. Smith, The Constitution in the Cave, 30 McGEORGE L. REV. 97, 101
(1998) (nature as an ordered, as opposed to ultimately arbitrary, reality that
transcends human convention and construction but is amenable to human theoretical
and practical reason).
29 Moore, Justifying the Natural Law Theory, supra note 294, at 2093.
Professor Moore elsewhere refers to tigers as a natural kind: "What I intend to refer to
when I use the word 'tiger' is not . . . 'whatever class of things meets my theory (or
definition) of tigers.' Rather, I intend to refer to real tigers, whatever the nature of that
class turns out to be." Moore, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, supra note 294,
at 128. Actually, we can imagine persons wanting, for practical reasons, to continue to.misuse" terms like "water" or "tiger" once their error was pointed out. But for a
believer in real truth and falsity in the realm of the moral to want to persist on a
seriously mistaken path once the moral error is pointed out, would generally itself
amount to a serious further moral error.
2% See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 676 (1966)
(Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black concluded that the majority was in fact.consulting its own notions rather than following the original meaning of the
Constitution." Id. at 677.
See id. at 675-76.
300 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89-92 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
30' See Harper, 383 U.S. at 677-78 (Black, J., dissenting). It should be noted
that Justice Black's dissents advocating originalism or textualism over "natural law"
are generally not lone dissents.
302 See id. at 677 (Black, J., dissenting); Adamson, 332 U.S. at 92 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
303 See Harper, 383 U.S. at 676 (Black, J., dissenting); Adamson, 332 U.S. at
91-92 (Black, J., dissenting).
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reasoning is inescapably part of analogizing and distinguishing
constitutional cases,"' but he believes that such moral
reasoning should be confined to deciding whether a new case
falls inside or outside the scope of an established or "old"
constitutional principle."5 Moral reasoning should not be used
to create major premises or new first principles for deciding
constitutional cases."0 This is apparently because no such
principles could be agreed upon by all conscientious persons. 7
The variety of perspectives on the right and the good indicates
not that there are no right answers in moral and legal
philosophy,300 but that there is no consensus as to what they
are.3" Thus, we are left, Bork argues, either with majoritarian
political rule,"' or with majoritarianism filtered through and
embodied in constitutional processes as originally understood. 1
Justice Black's and Robert Bork's critiques of natural
law/natural rights jurisprudence take on much different
meanings if their preferred constitutional theories - textualism
and originalism313 - are themselves inescapably and crucially
dependent on natural law/natural rights theories they reject.
Assume that Black's and Bork's Constitution was consented to
by what each theorist takes, on whatever grounds, to amount
to a sufficient majority. Still, the question of "who counts"
inescapablely arises. Is this question of "who counts" to be
decided in an utterly circular, question-begging way - by a
majority of those who are assumed to count? But why should a
judge, elected or not, or anyone else, then feel bound by that
304 See BORK, supra note 228, at 254.
305 See id.
306 See id.
307 See id. at 254-56.
308 See id. at 256.
309 See BORK, supra note 228, at 254-56.
"0 See id. at 258 ("[U]nless we can rank forms of gratification, the judge must
let the majority have its way.")."'o See id. at 257. Bork elaborates as follows:
The judge who takes as his guide the original understanding of the principles
stated in the Constitution faces none of these difficulties. His first principles
are given to him by the document, and he need only reason from these to see
that those principles are vindicated in the case brought before him. Nor is it
an objection that those who ratified the Constitution may have lacked a
shared systematic moral philosophy. They were elected legislators and under
no obligation to justify moral and political choices by a philosophy to which
all must consent.
Id.
313 Id.
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majority? Because that is what the majority of those who are
deemed to count wishes?
We might add in complications such as the existence of
slave-holders and the enslaved. But the complications are
inessential. If Black and Bork are to avoid the arbitrariness
and subjectivity of which they accuse natural law/natural
rights theory, they must somehow find a sufficient relevant
moral difference between those who count and those who do not
and between a resulting numerical majority and a minority.
Either they cannot do so,"' or they can do so only by tacit resort
to some broadly natural law/natural rights constitutionalism of
the kind they reject.314
113 To claim merely that a (voting) majority outvotes a (voting) minority is of
no moral interest; to claim that a voting majority must prevail over a voting minority
in some physical sense related to weight or force seems again either unilluminating, or
an empirical claim that is open to falsification and in any event is of doubtful moral
relevance. Cf JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 350 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) ("[It is necessary the Body should move that way
whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the majority: or else it is
impossible it should act or continue one Body, one Community."). Locke would hardly
pretend to describe a valid political system independent and apart from natural law
and natural rights. See, e.g., JOHN DUNN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LOCKE: AN
HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE 'Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT' 127
(1969); JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE AND EQUALITY 95 (2002) ("An awful lot of the
Second Treatise just is a presentation of natural law; it adds up to a natural law
argument . . . on issues such as property, punishment, and politics."). See also id. at
131 (law of nature as binding legislators).
314 We should pause to consider the objection that Black and Bork's theories
may be dependent upon natural law/natural rights theory, but that this dependence
occurs only at an earlier, more fundamental stage in their overall jurisprudential
theory, rather than the later stage at which some might invoke natural law/natural
rights theory to decide a case. We may say that Black and Bork's textualist/originalism
requires a natural law/natural rights foundation, but that Black and Bork can then
avoid further reliance on natural law/natural rights theory when deciding particular
cases? Even an avowed natural law/natural rights theorist (at the foundation of her
constitutional theory) might recommend against trying to decide some or all individual
cases by trying to sort out the specific natural law/natural rights principles at stake.
Thomas Aquinas accords substantial legal weight to custom itself. See
AQUINAS, supra note 101, at q. 97, a. 3. Natural law/natural rights theories can in this
sense be self-limiting. This does not significantly change the problem that Black, Bork,
or any other textualist or originalist faces. They all must still depend crucially and
deeply upon natural law/natural rights assertions, but their repudiation of such theory
is general. Their claim does not seem to be merely that natural law/natural rights
cannot be agreed upon or is too subjective only at the level of the judicial decision of
individual cases. They do not, for example, claim that we disagree more on the natural
law/natural rights merits of a police intrusion into a marital bed chamber in Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), than on the underlying natural law/natural rights
theory involved in determining more basically whether the ante-bellum Constitution
was valid and binding on all affected adults. In any event, neither Black nor Bork
attempts to show why the more foundational natural law theory works better than the
later, more specifically adjudicatory level natural law theory.
[Vol. 70:1
DEPENDENCE AND HIERARCHY
This result does not shield natural law/natural rights
constitutional theory from criticism. It certainly does not show
that explicit reference to natural law or natural rights should
dominate normative constitutional theory. Even an"underlying" or "foundational" natural law theorist could
argue31 that the intent of the framers was to minimize explicit
reference by courts to considerations of natural law/natural
rights theory."' And a direct response has not been offered to
Black and Bork's concerns over persisting disagreement over
the relatively specific dictates of natural law and natural
rights. We may think of this as the "epistemic".17 problem of
natural law/natural rights constitutional theory: What is the
practical value of some constitutional answers' better reflecting
natural rights, or being objectively more just than others, if
neither judges nor anyone else can reliably sort out those
better and worse answers?
We seem to be left with serious practical problems of
indeterminacy under any natural law/natural rights theory.
"5 See Robert P. George, Natural Law and the Constitution Revisited, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 273-74 (2001). Professor George states as follows:
[T]he framers and ratifiers of the Constitution sought to incorporate into the
nation's positive law key principles of natural justice. What a judge is
authorized to give effect to, however, when interpreting the Constitution is
the positive law that the Framers created. It is not the prerogative of judges to
alter or displace the positive law of the Constitution even when they believe
that their own view of what natural justice requires is superior to the view
embodied in the constitutional text.
Id. (emphasis added). This formulation would rule out some forms of the judicial
application of natural law, but would not, on its terms, rule out approaches indebted to
Michael S. Moore's theory. See generally the articles written by Michael S. Moore,
supra note 294, and the accompanying text. Opting for the Framers' presumed intent
at one level, whether justifiably or not, over the Framers' intent at another level, or in
another respect, seems to fall outside Professor George's strictures. For a further
statement of Professor George's position, see Robert P. George, Natural Law, the
Constitution, and the Theory and Practice of Judicial Review, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.
2269, 2282 (2001). Professor George argues as follows:
[T]he Constitution as I read the document places primary authority for giving
effect to natural law and protecting natural rights to the institutions of
democratic self-government, not to the Courts, in circumstances in which
nothing in the text, its structure, logic, or original understanding dictates an
answer to a dispute as to proper public policy.
Id. at 2282.
316 See, e.g., Thomas B. McAfee, The Constitution As Based on the Consent of
the Governed-Or, Should We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 80 OR. L. REV. 1245,
1258 (2001). See also Thomas B. McAfee, Inalienable Rights, Legal Enforceability, and
American Constitutions: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Concept of Unenumerated
Rights, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 747 (2001) (discussing in particular the proper limited
role of the Ninth Amendment).
31 See Moore, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, supra note 294, at
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But the indeterminacy of natural law/natural rights theory
does not release rival theories from their various dependencies.
The rival normative theories of constitutional decisionmaking
are still just as dependent on natural law/natural rights
approaches."8 Nor can the creative use by their adherents of
those rival constitutional theories fix for their own purposes or
somehow bypass the practical indeterminacies of natural
law/natural rights theory.
In this connection, John Hart Ely has famously
observed that: "'.[A]ll theories of natural law have a singular
vagueness which is both an advantage and a disadvantage in
the application of the theories.' The advantage . . . is that you
can invoke natural law to support anything . . .. The
disadvantage is that everybody understands that.".1
Additionally, there is the concern that if the Constitution is
authoritative only to the extent that it accords with our
independent judgments about political morality and structure,
then the Constitution itself is only a makeweight: What gives
force to our conclusions is simply our beliefs about what is
good, just, and efficient. "Taken to its logical conclusion, this
line of argument does not provide a reason for treating the
Constitution as authoritative; it instructs us to ignore the
Constitution whenever we disagree with it.
20
318 Natural law/natural rights theory is required as a logical and practical
basic underpinning of each of the major rival constitutional theories, but this role of
natural law/natural rights theory cannot guarantee that all of the rival theories, or
even that any one of them, will prove ultimately viable. Even with the assistance of
natural law/natural rights elements, each theory of constitutional decisionmaking may
still prove inadequate, singly or in combination. On the other hand, it is implausible to
argue that the indeterminacies of natural law/natural rights theories are intolerable
when such a theory is being used directly to adjudicate a constitutional case, but that
the taint of indeterminacy can somehow be avoided when natural law/natural rights
theory is crucially incorporated into other theories of constitutional adjudication.
Simply put, there is no reason to expect that the indeterminacy of natural law/natural
rights theory in deciding, say, abortion cases is likely to be greater or more crucial than
in justifying, say, originalist constitutional theories. Cf. Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law
Jurisprudence, 9 LEGAL THEORY 241, 264 (2003) ("There is no theory of adjudication
that can be both fairly called a natural law view and formulated an abstraction from
the details of any natural law moral or political theory.").
319 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 50 (1980) (footnote omitted). See also Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality, 1982
WiS. L. REV. 1061, 1101-02.
320 McConnell, supra note 201, at 1129. Again, it is not clear that natural law
adjudicatory theories of the general sort proposed by Michael S. Moore must be caught
up in this net. See generally the articles written by Michael S. Moore, supra note 294
and the accompanying text. Such a theory need not assert that the Framers' intent to
get morality correct, along with our own current best moral judgment, however hazy,
always trumps any other sort of expression of framer intent. There may be passages in
the Constitution in which trying to express true beliefs about moral reality may not
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If natural law/natural rights theory is both important to
constitutional interpretation and seriously indeterminate, all of
the major normative theories of constitutional decisionmaking
are inescapably affected by this indeterminacy." ' But, the
indeterminacy of natural law/natural rights theory, in general
or at the level of some particular theory, may actually be no
greater than the indeterminacies associated with the various
rival constitutional theories. The indeterminacies particularly
linked to rival constitutional theories are likely to be
substantial as well. Original intent theories, for example,
cannot plausibly claim to offer clear, unique, determinative
answers to most interesting constitutional questions. The
indeterminacy problem in the end does not affect the status of
natural law/natural rights theories as less dependent upon,
and essential to, their rivals.
We will not attempt here to reduce the indeterminacy of
natural law/natural rights approaches by arguing for some
specific favored version thereof. Instead, in the section below,
we will use the very breadth of natural law/natural rights
theories to gain some perspective on constitutional
decisionmaking. As broad and basic natural law/natural rights
theories most clearly suggest, constitutional decisionmaking is
inescapably a morally charged act. We shall briefly consider
below some of the implications of constitutional decisionmaking
understood as inevitable moral choice. In particular, we will
emphasize the importance of not losing sight of the natural
law/natural rights claim that some constitutional choices are
genuinely or objectively better than others, even if
indeterminacies persist.22  To the extent that natural
law/natural rights theories can best account merely for why
some constitutional adjudicative choices are genuinely better
have been uppermost in the Framers' minds. This may be true not only of relatively
trivial matters, such as the minimum age of a President, but even of important
passages such as the Article I congressional commerce clause. This is not to suggest
that either clause is without moral interest.
32' Again, it is possible that some or all of the rival theories of constitutional
adjudication would prove unsuccessful on other grounds even if such theories took
proper account of their dependency on other theories, including, in particular, on
natural law/natural rights theories.
122 Even if natural law/natural rights theories can, in a loose sense, be invoked
to support "anything," in the sense of (almost) any substantive policy, they can hardly
be invoked to support what are called "metaethical" positions with which they are
plainly inconsistent. Thus, natural law/natural rights theories cannot be brought to the
defense of a denial of the existence of objectively better and worse moral responses in
at least some instances of moral choice.
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than others, we will have an important reason beyond relative
self-sufficiency and independence for preferring the natural
law/natural rights family of normative constitutional theories.
III. FIRST THING'S FIRST IN CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE IDEAL OF
MORAL OBJECTIVITY
A. The Importance and the Inevitability of the Moral
To decide a constitutional question is inescapably a
moral activity. This is true not just for Supreme Court.3 and
other federal judges, but for executive. 4 and legislative25 branch
actors as well as for state executive,"6 legislative, 7 and
judicial32 officers. Voters who decide whether to amend a
Constitution similarly engage in moral acts.2 9 In all contexts,
one's constitutional choice - one's method of constitutional
decisionmaking and the substantive decisional outcome itself -"stand in need of full-fledged moral justification.""°
One's constitutional choice may nevertheless depend in
large measure upon role and context. Intermediate federal
appellate courts, for example, are typically reluctant to
anticipate the overruling of binding Supreme Court
precedent.' Persons deciding constitutional questions as moral
questions may take many considerations into account,
including role and institutional considerations, simplifying
3 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
324 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952);
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
325 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
326 See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
327 See id.
32 See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
'2 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
330 See David Lyons, Substance, Process, and Outcome in Constitutional
Theory, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 762 (1987).
31 See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2001). The court
stated:
It is not within our purview to anticipate whether the Supreme Court may
one day overrule its existing precedent. "[I]f a precedent of [the Supreme]
Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected
in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case
which directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of
overruling its own decision."
Id. at 155 n.6. (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997)).
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algorithms and short cuts, and a constitutional oath."' Thus,
constitutional decisionmakers will and perhaps should
typically not take every morally relevant consideration directly
into account. Non-moral considerations may be important, and
some moral consideration suppressed or simplified. This does
not make the constitutional decision any less of a moral
decision, however. One's responsibility for autonomous moral
decisionmaking remains,333 regardless of the range and variety
of one's limitations."
Constitutional choice is thus an inescapably moral
choice, but for our purposes, we need not try to identify the
predominant kind of moral thinking required. Moral thinking
takes various forms, sometimes focusing on doing the right
thing, sometimes on producing well-being, and sometimes on
acting virtuously. Despite the fact that American constitutional
decisionmaking is largely an exercise in defining and allocating
rights,335 we need not rule out welfare-based" ° or even virtue-
based337 approaches to morality.33 in deciding constitutional
questions."
32 See supra text accompanying note 247. See generally DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 105-07 (1988); Rob Atkinson, Beyond the
New Role Morality for Lawyers, 51 MD. L. REV. 853 (1992); Judith Andre, Role Morality
as a Complex Instance of Ordinary Morality, 28 AM. PHIL. Q. 73 (1991).
33 See, e.g., ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 13-15 (1998).
33 See Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Positivism, 25 CONN. L. REV. 797,
802-03 (1993) (discussing the inescapably moral decisionmaking in constitutional cases
faced by both positivist and non-positivist judges). Among one's moral decisions will be
those bearing upon one's willingness to set aside the constitutional judgments of other,
perhaps democratically elected actors. See also Christopher L. Eisgruber,
Constitutional Self-Government and Judicial Review: A Reply to Five Critics, 37 U.S.F.
L. REV. 115, 116-18 (2002); Larry Alexander, Can Law Survive the Asymmetry of
Authority?, 19 Q.L.R. 463, 467 (2000) ("[E]ven though the best rules will be somewhat
over and under-inclusive relative to their background moral reasons, and will thus, if
followed, result in some morally regrettable acts and consequences, the moral gains
from rules may still outweigh their costs.").
135 See generally DWORKIN, supra note 219.
33 See generally LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS
WELFARE (2002); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 961 (2001); J. J. C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND
AGAINST (1973).
337 See generally Michael Slote, Law in Virtue Ethics, 14 LAW & PHIL. 91
(1995); L.B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34
METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003). But see R. A. Duff, The Limits of Virtue Jurisprudence,
34 METAPHILOSOPHY 214 (2003) (critiquing Professor Solum's article); VIRTUE ETHICS
(Michael Slote & Roger Crisp eds., 1997); ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON VIRTUE ETHICS
(1999).
338 For an exceptionally useful background comparison of particular forms of
deontological, consequentialist, and virtue ethics, see MARCIA W. BARON ET AL., THREE
METHODS OF ETHICS: A DEBATE (1997). For classic discussions of the relative priority of
the right and the good, see H.A. Prichard, Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?,
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The constitutional decisionmaker may thus face a choice
of moral methodologies. But, no constitutional decisionmaker
can typically step outside of morality and decide a case on non-
moral but nonetheless rationally justifiable grounds, such as
the dictates of sheer prudence, interest, or aesthetic value. It is
impossible for the constitutional decisionmaker to transcend
morality.
To assess this claim, consider morality in the different
senses of the term. In the narrowest sense, morality refers
merely to possible alleged offensiveness of consenting adults'
conduct, with less emphasis on any possible resulting harm to
those or other persons.'4 Clearly, a constitutional decision can
transcend morality in this sense. Morality in this narrow,"moralistic" sense has been challenged, on broader moral
grounds, by John Stuart Mill 41 and by H. L. A. Hart in the
context of victimless crimes."
At the other extreme, morality might be defined broadly
and in such a way as to merely automatically override any
conflicting non-moral consideration. Other, non-moral
considerations may "feed into" a moral decision, but once it is
clear what morality requires or permits, the dictates of
morality by their very definition are decisive and overriding,
and cannot be reasonably trumped" by any other sort of
consideration. 4 This is often stated without much clarification
or exception."4
21 MIND 21 (1912); W.D. Ross, The Basis of Objective Judgments in Ethics, 37 INT'L. J.
ETHICS 113 (1927); W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (2d ed. 2003) (1930).
339 As an exercise, one might examine each of the various individual rights
guaranteed by the Constitution to determine whether their constitutional
enshrinement is more a matter of seeking to produce good welfarist consequences, or
else of respecting moral imperatives, perhaps focusing on human dignity, fairness, or
equality not reducible to consequentialist considerations. For further insight, see
Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and Its Constitutional Consequences, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 785, 792-94 (1994); Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of
Rights, 27 GA. L. REV. 415, 420-22 (1993) (discussing the work of Professor Richard
Fallon).
340 Perhaps any such narrow case could be more or less plausibly described in
"broader," more comprehensive moral terms, but that would not affect the point.
341 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich & George Kateb
eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859).
" See H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963).
This is not to suggest that moral rules must ever, let alone always, be
exceptionless, absolute, or of infinite scope of applicability.
See, e.g., D.Z. Phillips, Do Moral Considerations Override Others?, 29 PHIL.
Q. 247, 247 (1979) ("[O]ne distinguishing mark of moral considerations is that if a
person cares for them, he cannot, at the same time, say that they should be overridden
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Sometimes, though, under a more moderate view, there
is merely one sense among others in which the morally right
action cannot reasonably be overridden.' Or, alternatively, it is
held that morality can in limited cases appropriately be
transcended by aesthetic, cultural, or religious obligationsY
The scope of the moral in such cases often remains unclear,
however. For example, if one decides to abandon one's family
for the aesthetic inspiration of Tahiti,48 or even to commit
murder for the sake of obeying an assumedly superseding
divine command ,4 it is questionable whether such a person has
by considerations of any other kind.") (critiquing the view expressed in PHILIPPA FOOT,
VIRTUES AND VICES (1978)).
34' See, e.g., Fernando R. Teson, Collective Humanitarian Intervention, 17
MICH. J. INT'L L. 323, 337 (1996) ("moral reasons are overriding"); Kenneth Einar
Himma, Substance and Method in Conceptual Jurisprudence and Legal Theory, 88 VA.
L. REV. 1119, 1166 n.125 (2002) (book review) ("It is usually thought, as a conceptual
matter, that moral obligations override all other obligations.") (citing William K.
Frankena, The Concept of Morality, 63 J. PHIL. 688 (1966)). See also generally STEPHEN
L. DARWALL, IMPARTIAL REASON (1983) (moral considerations as providing overriding
reasons under appropriately specified circumstances); R.M. HARE, MORAL THINKING:
ITS LEVELS, METHOD AND POINT 55-60 (1981) (discussing moral principles as
overriding and going beyond concepts, such as, weakness of the will, moral "holidays, "
merely prima facie principles, etc.); KURT BAIER, THE MORAL POINT OF VIEW 155 (abr.
ed. 1965) (1958) ("[Bleing moral is following rules designed to overrule reasons of self-
interest whenever it is in the interest of everyone alike that such rules should be
generally followed.").
348 See, e.g., ALAN GEwIRTH, REASON AND MORALITY 1 (1978) (moral
requirements not overridable by non-moral considerations in the "core meaning" of the
term); J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 106-07 (1977) (discussing
morality as overriding or ultimate only in its broad, all-inclusive sense, as opposed to a
narrower sense, which emphasizes accommodating the interests of other persons); R.M.
HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON 168-69 (1963) (discussing morality as overriding in "a
sense of the word"); BERNARD GERT, MORALITY: A NEW JUSTIFICATION OF THE MORAL
RULES 203-05 (1988) (recognizing the possibility of incompatible religious mandates).
347 See generally JONATHAN DANCY, MORAL REASONS 43-47 (1993) (comparing
moral with non-moral reasons); G.J. WARNOCK, THE OBJECT OF MORALITY 157-59
(1971) (noting that moral considerations may be outweighed by purported strictly non-
moral considerations such as preservation of an historic beautiful house); PHILIPPA
FOOT, NATURAL GOODNESS 77-78 (2001) (discussing the decisiveness of "unjust" as
matched by the non-moral term "foolish"). See also Brian Leiter, Neitzsche and the
Morality Critics, 107 ETHICS 250, 258-59, 259 n.24 (1997).
348 As occasionally alleged with respect to the late 19th century artist Paul
Gauguin. For an approach differing from that of Michael Slote, supra note 337, and
that of Sarah Stroud, infra note 350, see generally Joseph M. Kupfer, Gauguin, Again,
73 PAC. PHIL. Q. 63 (1992).
349As discussed in the context of Abraham and Isaac. See SOREN
KIERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING (Howard V. Hong & Edna H. Hong trans.,
Princeton Univ. Press 1983) (1843) (discussing the possible "teleological" suspension of
the ethical).
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truly stepped outside the moral order and should not be
ultimately judged in moral terms. 5'
Despite disagreements over the scope of the moral, this
problem should ordinarily not loom large for constitutional
decisionmakers. Typically, a judge who decides a constitutional
case in the morally best or at least a morally permissible way
will have reached a result not reasonably improvable by
stepping outside of morality. Judges should thus not feel
licensed to suspend or override the ethical for the sake of other
considerations.
Suppose, for example, that someone claims a
constitutional right to knock down, perhaps merely for spite, a
beautiful historic house."5 ' A judge agrees with the claimant,
and the house is razed. Assuming that the judge has made the
morally best decision, should the judge have perhaps
nonetheless prohibited the demolition for the sake of non-moral
aesthetic or cultural values? Why can't the public aesthetic and
cultural values be reasonably brought within the scope of the
moral? Or if the judge has made a mistake, why isn't it the
moral mistake of over-extending or over-valuing under the
circumstances the asserted constitutional right to raze? If there
is any such right, why shouldn't it morally yield to a
sufficiently strong competing public interest in aesthetics or
culture?52
Depending on one's moral theory,' there may well be
instances in which deciding a constitutional case either way or
350 See generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Moral Overridingness and Moral
Subjectivism, 109 ETHICS 772 (1999) (discussing moral overridingness as compatible
with certain forms of moral subjectivism); Sarah Stroud, Moral Overridingness and
Moral Theory, 79 PAC. PHIL. Q. 170 (1998) (discussing consequentialist moral theories
as less easily reconciled with the overridingness of morality).
351 As discussed in G.J. WARNOCK, supra note 347.
3'" For a recent, but admittedly only loosely comparable case, see Nevel v.
Village of Schaumberg, 297 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2002) (denying permission to install
vinyl siding on a house designated as an historic landmark per village ordinance did
not violate owner's equal protection rights).
353 There may be, for example, moral "ties," and there may be cases in which
the opposing overall moral values are sufficiently close, or so difficult to compare, that
the moral costs of further examination of the two alternative courses of action exceed
any likely difference. Depending upon what we see as the purpose of morality, either of
two possible case outcomes may be morally permissible, if our moral theory allows for
"holes" of undefined moral status in the overall "Swiss cheese" of moral
decisionmaking. There may thus be zones of morally permissible constitutional
outcomes encompassing two different results in the case. By loose analogy, on some
moral schemes, if one is to be visited today by solicitors for four roughly equally worthy
charities, all else equal, there may be a number of morally permissibly ways to divide
up one's overall donation.
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on diverse grounds will be morally permissible. But this is far
from granting a license to the decisionmaker to subordinate
overall moral considerations in favor of non-moral values. Nor,
typically, should the judge decide constitutional questions on
the basis of sheer moral abstraction apart from any moral and
non-moral social, historical, and institutional context. A judge
who decides a constitutional case on moral grounds cannot
entirely arbitrarily limit the various morally relevant
considerations. For example, persons' reasonable expectations
under the relevant circumstances normally count as somehow
morally relevant. This opens the door for at least indirect
consideration and use of elements of the various alternative
theories of constitutional adjudication on many natural law or
natural rights-based theories. Even if morality did not
otherwise often require judges to consider constitutional text,
framer intent, precedent, and so on, the mere fact that many
persons perhaps quite reasonably expect judges to do so
potentially makes those considerations somehow morally
relevant. Judges are in a proper case also bound to consider
among other factors not only the moral value of democratic
politics, but its limits and failures as well.
Of course, a conscientious decisionmaker should strike a
proper and perhaps shifting balance between inclusion of
relevant considerations and justified simplification. There can
be no general moral license to over-simplify the constitutional
decisionmaking process, so that the judge seeks only something
like fidelity to the text, and ignores everything else. Public
reaction to one's decision may in various aspects be a further
morally relevant consideration, but a conscientious
decisionmaker cannot always be swayed by the threat of
misunderstanding or adverse public reaction. These sorts of
difficulties and their best resolution are inescapable elements
of any serious moral decisionmaking.
B. The Importance of Moral Objectivity
Apart from all the institutional, hierarchical,
informational, and broadly cultural considerations relevant to
the morality of constitutional decisionmaking, judges must also
consider the important possibility that some constitutional
outcomes may be objectively morally better than others.
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Suppose, for example, that we consider Brown"M objectively
morally better than Plessy. "' What does a reference to moral
objectivity add to such a statement? Does calling the case of
Brown "objectively" morally better add much of significance to
just saying that it is morally better or morally preferred?
It is useful at this point to call upon a familiar, if
controversial," distinction between two "levels" of talk about
morality, in order to see the import of the ideal of moral
objectivity. Here is an example: Suppose Person A says that
gryphons have the wings of an eagle, meaning that the thus-
named purely imaginary construct is, as a matter of definition,
winged like an eagle; Person B says that gryphons do not have
the wings of an eagle, meaning that the same imaginary
construct has, to her understanding, no wings at all; Person C
says what A says, but means that he has just carefully
35 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
""' Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
356 The distinction in question might not seem meaningful to some theistic
ethicists, nor to some decidedly non-theistic ethicists such as Ronald Dworkin,
Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87 (1996), and, to a
perhaps slightly lesser degree, THOMAS NAGEL, THE LAST WORD, 125 (1997). Professor
Dworkin, as his article title suggests, employs the language of moral objectivity. But
while Dworkin is critical of pragmatists and other postmodernists who abandon the
language of moral objectivity, it is not entirely clear how much his metaethical position
really differs from theirs. Professor Dworkin, in using the term "objectivity," may wish
to claim that some acts would be morally wrong even if no one believed them to be
morally wrong. But he also seems to be so broadly critical of any possible metaphysics
of morals that we are left to wonder on what grounds moral truth could be so
independent of universal moral belief. Just adding up various first-order or
'normative" claims - e.g., that the act in question is cruel, or causes unnecessary
suffering, along with some ordinary facts, does not at any point change a moral claim
to an objectively true moral claim, or establish any act as objectively morally right or
wrong.
Perhaps Professor Dworkin wants to distinguish mere universal moral
belief, which can be mistaken, from moral beliefs that would be held under ideal
conditions of full information, dispassionate neutrality, and so on. But it may be
difficult to pick out some conditions as inevitably producing correct moral beliefs
without having to draw upon some notion of the reality or the metaphysics of moral
truth already rejected by Dworkin. See Dworkin, supra, at 104-05 (dismissing the idea
of moral particles - "morons"- constituting moral "fields" responsible for objective
moral rightness or wrongness, as part of "the fabric of the moral universe"); id. at 139
(describing the rejection of moral objectivity as "just false, bad philosophy"). See also
Ronald Dworkin, The Practice of Principle, 115 HARv. L. REV. 1655 (2002) (reviewing
JULES COLEMAN, IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY (2001)).
For reactions to Dworkin's apparent moral-objectivity-without-metaphysics position,
see Brian Leiter, Objectivity, Morality, and Adjudication, in OBJECTIvITY IN LAW AND
MORALS 66 (Brian Leiter ed., 2001); Nicos Stavropoulos, Review of Objectivity in Law
and Morals, 65 MODERN L. REV. 634 (2002); John Tasioulas, The Legal Relevance of
Ethical Objectivity, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 211, 225-27 (2002). See also commentaries by
Simon Blackburn and Michael Otsuka, http://www.brown.edu/Departments/
Philosophy/bears/ symp-dworkin.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
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observed an actual gryphon in vivo, and has seen its eagles
wings, and Person D says what B says but means that his own
careful observation of actual gryphons has persuaded her that
such actual gryphons are wingless.
This four person conversation about gryphons is not
reducible to a single debate over a single issue, with two
interlocutors on both sides fully supporting one another. It
would beg the question to say that the overall debate is about
the mere concept of a gryphon, or that it is about what would
be discovered the next time a gryphon is encountered. Neither
kind or level of question about gryphons is reducible to the
other.
Loosely similar considerations arise when we use the
moral language of constitutional law. When we say that Brown
is morally or constitutionally better than Plessy, we may
actually mean various importantly different things at different
levels. Developments in ethical theory over the previous
century have only multiplied the surprising range of different
meanings morally endorsing Brown could have.
Professor John Mackie offered a useful distinction
between the different meanings of morality."' Mackie first
grouped together statements that an action is morally right or
wrong, good or bad, virtuous or vicious, along with similar
claims raised to the level of a broader moral principle, such as
that we morally ought to minimize suffering."5 These
statements Mackie referred to as "first-order,"35' or what we
might call "normative," ethical judgments.
In contrast, Mackie also referred to "second-order,"" or
what we might call "metaethical," statements. These include
claims about the nature of first-order moral claims, or about
"what is going on""' when we make such first-order moral
claims. Are we claiming to have noticed something, figured out,
or intuited something? Are we perhaps just expressing a
preference, and inviting others to share that preference? Are
we expressing some complex mental state, including the
accepting of certain norms and beliefs, but in which our beliefs
and decisions are ultimately emotionally or attitudinally
driven? Is claiming that Brown is morally better than Plessy
357 See J.L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 9 (1977).
358 Id.
359 Id.
360 Id.
361 Id.
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like claiming that the sun is larger than the moon, or like
claiming that ice cream tastes better than tree bark, or more
like claiming that chocolate tastes better than vanilla?
Other accounts of what we are doing when we make
constitutional moral claims, or of the metaethical status of
these claims, are possible."' And it is fair to ask whether the
metaethical status of constitutional moral talk really makes
any practical difference. Some writers seem to believe that it
does not,3" and others that it does.3" This Part will briefly
conclude below that a constitutional decisionmaker's
continuing quest for objectively morally better answers can in
some cases make an important difference. To the extent that
natural law or natural rights theories can best account for the
362 See, e.g., ALEXANDER MILLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY
METAETHICS (2003); SIMON BLACKBURN, RULING PASSIONS: A THEORY OF PRACTICAL
REASONING (1998); ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF
NORMATIVE JUDGMENT (1990); RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY
(1989); Stephen Darwall, et al., Toward Fin de Sicle Ethics, 101 PHIL. REV. 115 (1992).
In RULING PASSIONS, supra, Professor Blackburn seeks to avoid both relativism and
any sort of interesting moral metaphysics. As in Professor Dworkin's approach, moral
objectivity, knowledge, and truth for Blackburn rise no higher than our non-
metaphysical attitudes, emotions, and beliefs. These include, interestingly, that slavery
would be wrong regardless of our attitudes, emotions, and beliefs about slavery. See
BLACKBURN, supra, at 296 n.12.
Whether one can avoid moral relativism while resisting moral metaphysics
is again unclear. Professor Blackburn thinks of improving one's moral attitudes in
terms of avoiding inconsistency, immaturity, unimaginativeness, bias, coarseness, and
natural corruption. See id. at 313, 320. Someone else, of course, might offer a different
list - perhaps with bolder and more vitalistic Nietzschean virtues - or redefine the
elements of Blackburn's list. What "bias" amounts to with respect to animals or future
generations is disputable, as is the point at which coarseness begins, or the contrast
between coarseness and an anti-vitalistic hyper-refinement. Are these sorts of disputes,
including what constitutes "the corruption of human nature," id. at 320, really to be
addressed with no reference to metaphysics? Yet we are somehow to avoid moral
relativism. See id. at 314. For commentary addressing this area of Professor'
Blackburn's work, see, e.g., Russell Shafer-Landau, Review of Ruling Passions, 111
ETHICS 799, 803 (2001); Thomas Baldwin, Expressing Feelings and Synthesizing
Truths, 42 PHIL. BOOKS 3, 8 (2001); Michael Bratman, Review of Ruling Passions, 109
PHIL. REV. 586, 587-88 (2000); Max Kolbel, Review of Ruling Passions, 111 MIND 373,
379-80 (2002) (discussing Blackburn's view on relativism).
30 See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 164-87 (1999); JEREMY
WALDRON, THE IRRELEVANCE OF MORAL OBJECTIVITY, IN NATURAL LAW THEORY:
CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 158-87 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). For related follow-up, see
Jeremy Waldron, Introduction: Disagreements on Rights and Justice, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL'Y 5 (2002-2003); Jeremy Waldron, Moral Truth and Judicial Review, 43
AM. J. JURIS. 75 (1998) [hereinafter Waldron, Moral Truth]. One might also argue the
broader claim that moral theory more generally has little practical impact on the world
when even the most cogent argument is matched against powerful basic interests. See
Brian Leiter, Marxism and the Continuing Irrelevance of Normative Theory, 54 STAN.
L. REV. 1129, 1151 (2002).
3r See, e.g., Tasioulas, supra note 356; Dale Smith, The Use of Meta-Ethics in
Adjudication, 23 Ox. J. LEGAL STUD. 25 (2003).
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value added by the quest for morally objectively better
answers, such constitutional theories again have value
independent of other, rival constitutional theories. This
conclusion is obscured, but not genuinely undermined, by
moral indeterminacies and by the increasing sophistication of
various kinds of non-objectivist metaethics."6'
In fact, non-objectivist moral theory has become so
sophisticated that it is admittedly now practically impossible to
say precisely what moral objectivity is supposed to mean in a
neutral, inclusive, non-controversial way that nonetheless rules
out non-objectivism.3 " As a mere rough approximation, we
might seize upon Professor Robert M. Adams' formulation, in
which "ethical statements are generally intended to state facts,
facts that obtain independently of the preferences, feelings, and
beliefs of speaker and hearer, and that... 'good' and 'right' are
meant to signify properties of persons, actions, and other
objects."3 7
The rough idea underlying moral objectivity is that it is
possible for all thoughtful, reasonably disinterested moral
decisionmakers to be mistaken, individually or across the
board, for an indefinitely long period of time, even in their
survival-conferring or otherwise useful moral beliefs. Put
differently, any viable culture or group of cultures could be for
various reasons morally mistaken. In fact, cultures could be
morally mistaken in all they regard as morally significant.
Some useful acts or practices could be morally wrong even if no
actual moral actor ever thought so."
36 See generally Blackburn, supra note 362.
'6 For reference to the difficulties in this respect, see Darwall et al., supra
note 362, at 126 n.29; Charles Larmore, Review of Thomas Nagel, The Last Word, 109
ETHICS 166, 167 (1998) (attempting to sort out objectivity, universal validity, universal
persuasiveness, and universal justifiability).
3" Robert Merrihew Adams, Prdcis of Finite and Infinite Goods, 64 PHIL. &
PHENOMENON RES. 439, 439-40 (2002). This formulation is useful in seeking to exclude
the idea that morality can rise no higher than the consistent standards of some
individual or group. It requires clarification in that the objectively morally right things
to do often depend in one way or another on the feelings or beliefs of some party.
Adams' formulation is far broader than is necessary to rule out Hamlet's "there is
nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so[,]" including even some of the more
sophisticated modern formulations. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 2, sc. 2 (T.J.B.
Spencer ed., Penguin Books 1980) (1623).
368 One might object to our attempt to define 'objectivity' here by pointing out
that some moral objectivists have believed pervasive basic moral mistakenness to be
impossible. See, e.g., AQUINAS, supra note 101, at q. 94, a. 6. As well, one might make
an argument loosely inspired by Wittgenstein or Davidson that if a group were
consistently, radically mistaken in their basic moral beliefs, we would not know
whether they were actually trying to "do" what we call morality. As to the hopelessness
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Does the possibility, and perhaps the occasional reality,
of one moral judgment being objectively better than another
moral judgment make any significant difference369 in the realm
of constitutional decisionmaking? Some think that it does not.
The main problem, as elaborated by Professor Jeremy
Waldron,37 involves the gulf between the mere existence of an
objectively better answer, and the reliable identification of that
objectively better answer. Mere existence and practical
detectability are two different things. The mere existence,
somewhere, of an underground oil pool that is Clampettian in
size does no good if it cannot be located.
If constitutional decisionmakers generally cannot claim
reliable access to objectively right constitutional answers, what
practical difference does the mere existence of such
unidentified right answers make? Judges who cannot reliably
identify the objective better answers must be, in the end,
relying on their own value judgments and reasoning processes.
But this, it is said, is essentially what judges would do if there
were no objective morally better constitutional answers in the
first place and if we all recognized that fact. Thus, it is said, the
mere existence or non-existence of objective morally better and
worse constitutional answers makes no practical difference."'
This is certainly a difficult challenge for a moral
objectivist to answer, especially considering the subtlety of the
various forms of non-objectivist moral discourse. A non-
objectivist judge who rules favorably for a civil rights plaintiff
of defining moral objectivity, see Tasioulas, supra note 356, at 216, stating that "with
'ethics' there is no definitive characterization of 'objectivity' either in ethics or more
generally." One broad problem is a basic mismatch between morality as a living
institution, activity, or relation, and the oddly abstract and ill-suited concepts and
terminology with which philosophers insist on analyzing morality. This mismatch
generates anomalies, paradoxes, and insoluble problems, but not to the discredit of
morality itself.
369 For brief suggestions that moral objectivity itself can matter in important
practical ways, see, e.g., Steven D. Smith, The Constitution in the Cave, 30 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 97, 103 (1998) ("Eliminate the assumption that ethical thought is about some
objective reality, though, and the aversion to contradiction loses much of its warrant.");
Robert P. George, Holmes On Natural Law, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2003). George
commented:
Recognition that a 'belief or 'love' one thought to be rationally... warranted.
. is, in truth, a mere subjective emotion, with no objective rational or moral
warrant, is unlikely to leave that belief or love unaffected even in respect to
the emotional intensity with which one holds it.
Id.
3'0 For a review of the works of Professor Waldron, see generally supra note
363.
371 See Smith, supra note 364, at 30-40.
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on an excessive force claim certainly need not solely point to
her own physio-chemical reactions to the testimony, to her own
attitudes or emotions, or to the collective survival value of
ruling one way rather than another."2 The non-objectivist judge
can instead sensibly mention things like the unprovoked,
unnecessary, or extreme character of the beating and its
physical and emotional consequences for the civil rights
plaintiff. The practical value of moral objectivism in
constitutional adjudication seems thereby further diminished,
given that the moral non-objectivist borrows or imitates much
of what the moral objectivist might want to say.
In defense of the practical importance of moral
objectivity, however, let us focus ironically on obvious judicial
embarrassments to moral objectivity, such as Dred Scott v.
Sandford.. or Korematsu v. United States."4 We can hardly
claim that the underlying abuse described in even the later
Korematsu case somehow reflects indirectly the increasing
influence of emotivist. 75  revolts against the ideal of
constitutional moral objectivism. The moral logic of Dred Scott
and Korematsu can easily be repudiated on moral objectivist
grounds. But it is also possible for adherents of any non-
objectivist approach to reject these cases as well. What is it,
then, that the ideal of moral objectivism can offer in such cases
that non-objectivist approaches cannot entirely match with
equal plausibility?
Here, one must say that the very aspiration to objective
morally better answers seems in and of itself to better capture
what is really at stake, or the real nature of the underlying
injuries in Dred Scott and in Korematsu. The moral anti-
objectivist may say that these cases and their judicial
resolution are ultimately about many things, including
expression of attitudes, attempts to persuade others to adopt
one's attitudes, rhetorical technique and effect, culture and
312 See, e.g., Blackburn, supra note 362, at 307-08. See also Allan Gibbard,
Normative Objectivity, 19 NOUS 41 (1985).
373 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (constitutionally repealed by the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments).
374 323 U.S. 214 (1944), criticized in Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d
591, 593 (9th Cir. 1987).
375 For general development of emotivist metaethics, see generally A.J. AYER,
LANGUAGE, TRUTH, AND LOGIC (1946 ed.); CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS AND
LANGUAGE (1944); Gibbard, supra note 362; Waldron, Moral Truth, supra note 363, at
75.
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convention, genetic fitness, and individual or group-relative
norms.
The moral objectivist may concede the possible
relevance of any or all of these concerns, while still insisting
that something more or deeper is also at stake in Dred Scott
and Korematsu. More specifically, if a dominant group of
persons, as in Dred Scott, holds a group of persons to be
reducible to the status of property rather than of persons,37 the
focus must not be on the clash between the attitudes and
beliefs of that dominant group and the different attitudes and
beliefs of any who oppose them. Rather, the point is that
traditional slavery objectively violates personhood and the
rights of persons. Moreover, the latter point can be true even if
our attitudes and beliefs led us to believe otherwise, and we
were all thus able to somehow convince ourselves to the
contrary.77
We should not oversimplify the politics of such cases. At
some point, even those who dismiss the ideal of moral
objectivity may happen to take the side of the subordinated
group, perhaps out of a sense of emotional sympathy, or
perhaps of the appeal of Romantic moral posturing at minimal
personal cost. In the absence of any aspiration to moral
objectivity, the debate over Korematsu can still be subtle and
complex. Such a debate must, however, hauntingly lack a
certain dimension of depth. Many would want to suggest that
the denial of basic social and citizenship rights, based on an
analysis of racial or ethnic ancestry rather than on
individualized suspicion, is contrary to the inherent and
inviolable dignity and equality of the human person."8 This
376 See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407 (For many years before the Constitution,
.respectable" white public opinion held that an African-American 'had no rights which
the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be
reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary
article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it."). We may
simply ask whether, when we discuss such an arrangement, we gain or lose when we
set aside the claim that such arrangements are, objectively, profoundly wrong, in a
sense that transcends group convention, pragmatic utility, genetic advantages, attitude
or group norm expression, or any other of the varied ways of replacing the aspiration to
moral objectivity. Similarly, should we view Korematsu as something like a mere battle
of the contrasting attitudes of a dominant and a subordinate group, with everyone
implicitly invited to join the fray on one side or another, but without any aspiration to
any resolution objective grounds?
... See id.
37S Consider the language of Justice Frank Murphy, dissenting in Korematsu:
[T]o infer that examples of individual disloyalty prove group disloyalty and
justify discriminatory action against the entire group is to deny that under
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allegedly naive and straightforward reaction, depending on
how it is developed, may also turn out to be our most
sophisticated, most illuminating, and ultimately most accurate
reaction. If we abandon the idea of moral objectivity, we can at
best try somehow to translate this underlying claim into some
reduced, flattened and distorted, non-objectivist form that
misses the essence of the dignity and of fundamental equality
of persons and thus the ultimate harm in Korematsu.
The cost of dismissing the goal of moral objectivity,
though, is not merely one of losing a crucial dimension of the
underlying moral problem. The abandonment of the aspiration
to moral objectivity - a metaethical claim - will in practice,
over time, likely turn out not to be substantively morally
neutral at the level of normative or first-order ethics.379
Doubtless the pretense to objective moral rightness commonly
has been wrongly asserted by even the most brutally
oppressive political institutions throughout history.' But the
development of allegedly objectively grounded principles of
personal dignity, autonomy, equality, and solidarity"' has also
over the past several centuries irregularly but increasingly
undermined the case for such oppression. Whether these and
related values are really best served over the long term by the
consistent abandonment of the aspiration to moral objectivity
in legal decisionmaking is far from clear.
We must also ask whether contemporary forms of moral
non-objectivism, including various forms of group-oriented
our system of law individual guilt is the sole basis for deprivation of rights..
. . To give constitutional sanction to that inference in this case ... is to adopt
one of the cruelest of the rationales of our enemies to destroy the dignity of
the individual.
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 240 (Murphy, J., dissenting). There is much in Justice
Murphy's discussion that can, with some plausibility, be taken in conventionalist or
group-relative moral terms. There is certainly a sense of "us" versus "them," of what
"we" do as opposed to what "they" do. But by the time we reach Justice Murphy's
invocation of "the dignity of the individual," it seems evident that Justice Murphy is
seeking to evoke the objectivity of some moral wrongs. See id.
379 For this general distinction, see MACKIE, supra note 357, at 9. Recall,
though, that this distinction is more or less rejected by Ronald Dworkin, supra note
356.
380 Nearly every brutally, violently repressive regime from Torquemada's
Inquisition, to Hitler and Stalin, to Pol Pot, at the very least, augmented any reliance
on group or class identifications with some appeal to objective moral right and wrong.
38 This requires only a sympathetic reading of documents running from the
Declaration of Independence (1776) and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man
and of the Citizen (1789) (referring to "the natural, unalienable, and sacred rights of
man") all the way up to the Nuremburg Code (1947) and the European Parliament
Resolution on Human Cloning (2000).
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relativism and moral skepticism, really have much long-term
overall progressive value. Again, any sort of mere faddism or
moral posturing, particularly if the actual personal costs are
low, can for a time sustain progressive movements. Eventually,
though, the basic elements of political and constitutional
progressivism will generally require rather substantial and
sustained sacrifices of wealth and power by the relatively well
off.
If constitutional progressivism is thus to proceed beyond
largely symbolic or limited changes, and to seriously confront
the most basic economic and social obstacles faced by the most
structurally disadvantaged, a substantial long-term
redistribution of society's resources and opportunities will have
to be undertaken. This sort of substantial redistribution is
unlikely to leave everyone, including the privileged, at least as
well off as before. These sorts of broad-scale redistributive
undertakings may well require the abandonment of familiar
privilege and substantial tangible and intangible resource
advantages." The beneficiaries of such redistributions may
well be those with whom the transferors share relatively little
genetically or culturally, and who are ultimately unlikely or
unable to cooperate voluntarily in such a crucial redistributive
undertaking.
Constitutional progressivism is thus tied up with
substantial and sustained individual and group sacrifices, with
such sacrifice being largely by well-off and economically
powerful persons and groups who are identifiable in advance. A
constitutional progressive must wonder, then, whether any
form of non-objectivism in constitutional morality is likely,
with no disguised recourse to moral objectivity, to prove
sufficiently motivating for a sufficient number of persons over a
sufficient period of time.
Constitutional progressivism with no aspiration to
objective moral rightness would be asking persons and groups
accustomed to power and advantage to do much more than
engage in minimalism, symbolism, tokenism, and moral
preening. Substantial and likely uncompensated sacrifice by
the relevant groups and individuals, and by their own
382 Thus, progressive accounts of basic constitutional and other institutional
change often build in, as in the case of John Rawls' famed "veil of ignorance," some
mechanism for bypassing the likely need for substantial sacrifice on the part of
relatively well-off persons and groups. See JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11, 118-
23 (rev. ed. 1999) (1971).
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immediate descendents, would be required. By our assumption,
the case for that sacrifice could not, even by disguise, rhetoric,
or indirection, depend in the slightest on the idea that such
sacrifice is objectively just, fair, or right. No recourse to the
idea of such a sacrifice's being objectively morally appropriate,
let alone morally required, could be allowed.
No doubt constitutional progressives could tell "sad" and
"sentimental stories"' intended to inspire elite compliance
with the broad and on-going overall sacrificial enterprise.
Persons less disposed toward such sacrifice could, however, tell
counter-stories of supposed personal desert, individual
heroism, redistributive waste and inefficiency, intrusion, sense
of violation, disruption and loss, and so on. And the "sad" and"sentimental stories " " told in favor of re-distribution would on
their own logic again be barred from drawing in any way upon
the idea of any objective right or wrong."
Doubtless, the sword of moral objectivism in the
constitutional realm and elsewhere has always been
regrettably double-edged. But anyone with sympathy for
progressive constitutionalism should recognize moral
objectivism as practically indispensable to the success of such a
project." We should therefore think not only in moral terms in
3 See 3 RICHARD RORTY, TRUTH AND PROGRESS: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 172
(1998).
s See id.
See generally G.A. COHEN, IF YOU'RE AN EGALITARIAN, How COME YOU'RE
SO RICH? 117-63 (2000).
"'6 Professor Dworkin is one of the great contemporary champions of a form of
substantive egalitarianism. See, e.g., RONALD DwORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY (2000). He is, however, not particularly aggressive
in translating this sort of moral preference into equal protection clause jurisprudence.
For an argument that Dworkin winds up excessively bound to the constitutional text,
whatever the moral status of that text, and should actually give freer reign to more
"abstract" moral philosophy independent of that text, see Edward B. Foley,
Interpretation and Philosophy: Dworkin's Constitution, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 151
(1997). Professor Foley, in turn, would emphasize moral philosophy on its own terms,
not because the Constitution itself is thought to require such an emphasis, but because
Foley emphasizes a form of consent theory, which we have seen to be crucially
dependent upon rival, more basic theories. See id. at 171-72; see also supra Part II.D.
Professor Dworkin's constitutional theory has also been characterized as a
semantic or word-meaning originalism, as opposed to an originalism that is bound by
the Framers' own subjective intent, expectations, and inferences. See Jeffrey
Goldsworthy, Dworkin As An Originalist, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 49, 49-50 (2000). If we
focus on the moral elements of Professor Dworkin's approach, we must first decide
whether to characterize Dworkin's moral thinking as really aspiring to objectivity or
not. See generally Dworkin, supra note 356.
We would then want to explore why Dworkin bifurcates his constitutional
theory first into a concern for "fit" and second into a concern for "justification" or moral
principle. We sould also like to see why certain elements are included within or
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deciding constitutional cases, we should aspire to objectively
morally better rather than worse answers in any such cases.
This emphasis on moral rightness, of an objective sort,
of course corresponds most directly to the character of the most
fundamental, independent, and self-sufficient normative
constitutional theories, those focusing on natural law and
natural rights. The broad family of natural law and natural
rights constitutional theories is thus not only the most self-
sufficient of all the rival theories, but best accounts for and
most naturally accommodates our entirely reasonable and
worthwhile aspiration to objectively morally better answers to
crucial constitutional questions.
excluded from considerations of "fit," and why the relation between "fit" and
"justification" is one of strict hierarchy, given some minimal degree of fit, and not one
of balancing degrees of fit and justification or even of ignoring 'fit' altogether. Finally,
we would want to know why we are to be making the Constitution the best it can be, as
opposed to, say, doing the morally right thing, maximizing virtue, or producing the best
possible consequences.
In any event, we would recognize that Dworkin even at his most explicitly
moralistic offers us only one possible model among others for the morality of
constitutional decisionmaking. For a discussion of the more and less moral aspects of
Dworkin's constitutional decisionmaking theory, see Michael W. McConnell, The
Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment On Ronald Dworkin's "Moral
Reading" of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269 (1997).
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